Questions the competence of key personnel on the rig that exploded in the Gulf of Mexico in April.
Decisions taken by BP before the explosion of the deepwater horizon drilling rig suggest potential risks were ignored and a “lack of operating discipline” contributed to the disaster, according to an interim report from a technical panel.
The findings question the competence of key personnel on the rig that exploded in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, according to the report by a committee of the National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. The blast sank the rig, killed 11 workers and set off the worst US oil spill.
The report highlights the decision to proceed with temporarily sealing the well, after tests showed cement put in place to prevent natural gas from seeping in wasn’t effective, similar to the conclusion reached by a panel formed by President Barack Obama. US regulators responsible for overseeing offshore drilling provided “insufficient” checks and balances, the report found.
“Important decisions taken to proceed towards well abandonment despite several indications of potential hazard suggest an insufficient consideration of risks,” Donald Winter, former secretary of the Navy and chair of the study committee, said in a statement.
These flawed decisions weren’t identified or corrected by BP and its service contractors, or by the oversight process employed by the US Minerals Management Service and other regulatory agencies, Winter said.
Shares goal
BP shares the authorities’ “goal to prevent future accidents and oil spills from offshore drilling operations,” the company said in an e-mailed statement. “Therefore, we have cooperated with the committee and will continue to do so as it reviews the issues raised in its interim report.”
The blowout spewed crude into the Gulf for 87 days and shut thousands of square miles to fishing. Last month, the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill appointed by Obama said cement recommended by Halliburton Co, the world’s second-largest oilfield-services provider, to seal the well was unstable and may have led to the explosion.
It may not be possible to determine why oil and gas entered BP’s Macondo well because of the death of key witnesses, the loss of the rig and operating records and the difficulty in trying to obtain evidence from the site, 5,000 feet below the surface, the report said.
‘Lacks information’
The committee also lacks information from the blowout preventer, the device that failed to shut off the flow of oil and gas in the event of a blowout. It offered no recommendations in its preliminary report.
Though test results indicated the cement meant to seal the well was suspect, workers on the rig proceeded with steps to temporarily abandon the exploratory well, the report found. The decision to accept the results without a review by engineers based on shore “suggests a lack of onboard expertise and of clearly defined responsibilities,” added the report.
Bad decisions were compounded by delays in recognising that oil and gas were flowing into the well. Hydrocarbons entered the well undetected for almost an hour before the first explosion. Actions to control the well weren’t taken.
