Like the drama in a T20 clash, the tussle between N Srinivasan and Lalit Modi characterised and reshaped IPL this year.
When it came to IPL in 2010, what happened off the field was more dramatic than the game. The year was defined by the power struggle between two contrasting cricket administrators and their fluctuating — and inversely-proportional — fortunes.
On one side was N Srinivasan, the conservative, low-profile, Tamil Brahmin CMD of India Cements, which owns Chennai Super Kings, and who is more famously known as the real wielder of power within the Board for Control of Cricket in India (BCCI).
Pitched against him was Lalit Modi, the confident, almost arrogant man of fine taste, who breathed sports and money, and who was suspended after his spectacular rise in 2007.
The first few months of the year saw the continuing rise of Modi, especially after a swashbuckling IPL Season 3. But Srinivasan, the BCCI secretary and president-designate, bowled a string of top-spinners to get rid of Modi. The BCCI suspended Modi as the IPL commissioner and in April and May 2010 slapped three show-cause notices on him alleging financial and other irregularities.
Modi may get another chance to bat, as some of the decisions taken by BCCI against him and his friends were undone. The suspension of two teams, Rajasthan Royals and Kings XI Punjab, which are partially owned by Modi’s relatives, was stayed by the courts.
Both teams will participate in the players’ auction in early January 2011. There is a possibility that ten teams, as against eight, will play in IPL-4. These two factors may distort the economics of IPL, and hurt the financial state of the BCCI and IPL franchise owners.
Business Standard traces the genesis of the fight between the BCCI’s real czar, Srinivasan, and the former uncrowned prince of IPL, Modi.
Despite emails, telephone calls and mobile messages, Srinivasan refused to speak to this newspaper. In a telephonic interview, Shashank Manohar, the BCCI President, said he did not wish to discuss internal matters of the board publicly.
The Modi-Srinivasan spat began as soon as BCCI decided to go ahead with IPL in 2007. It centred around three issues: the signing of lucrative contracts, control over the huge IPL finances, and the duo’s ability to swing the league to favour their cherished teams.
Lost in contracts
In his earlier avatar as the board’s treasurer, and more so in his current role as its secretary, Srinivasan wanted to keep a hawk-eye on all cricket-related contracts and deals.
However, once Modi catapulted to IPL fame, he ran the league like a dictator. Modi signed contracts on his own, sometimes at 4 am in the morning. He kept many of them in his custody without sharing them with BCCI or the IPL governing council.
After Modi’s suspension, BCCI alleged that he doled out sweetheart deals to his friends without consulting anyone in BCCI. According to BCCI’s third show-cause notice issued on May 31, 2010, the clauses for theatrical rights to show IPL matches in cinema halls were designed to help one company.
It added that just before IPL-3, the rights to exploit 150 seconds of free commercial time per IPL match, which was included in the MSM (Sony) broadcast contract for the purpose of promoting IPL, were given to Pioneer Digadsys on a commercial basis, without signing an agreement. Modi’s justification was that this was a pilot project, executed at the last minute and, therefore, there was no time to sign a legal contract.
At a press conference in mid-2010, Manohar said the deal for the IPL awards ceremony, held days before the finals of IPL-3, was signed at the crack of dawn on the day of the event and, hence, the IPL office did not have a copy until after the event was over.
This irked Srinivasan. He loathed such bypassing of BCCI’s rules. He wanted his control back.
Fingers in the financial pie
Modi’s reply (May 15, 2010) to the first show-cause notice alleged that Srinivasan had sought to control the board’s finances. As the treasurer, Srinivasan insisted he was “the proper person to sign cheques and do the final approval of expenses”. As the secretary, he contended that “everything be routed through you (Srinivasan), before going to the treasurer”.
The head of the board’s finance department and its internal auditor, charged Modi, worked for India Cement, where Srinivasan is CMD. “They (the two finance personnel) have a close — previous and continuing — association with you.”
If this is indeed true – no one from BCCI wanted to comment on it – Modi’s style of functioning would have angered the tight-fisted Srinivasan. He would have fumed when, as alleged by BCCI, the former IPL commissioner inked deals worth millions and billions of dollars without sharing the details with either the board or the IPL governing council.
For instance, in the first show-cause notice (April 26, 2010), the BCCI secretary charged that “facilitation fees” of $80 million were paid by MSM (Sony) to World Sports Group, when the latter gave up its broadcast rights for the Indian subcontinent in favour of Sony in 2009. Modi said he knew nothing about the payments.
Duels over IPL teams
Srinivasan and Modi were at loggerheads over how to tweak internal policies to suit the teams they wanted to favour. Srinivasan said Modi tried to help teams like Rajasthan Royals and Kings XI Punjab, which were partially owned by his relatives. Modi said that the former left no stone unturned to support the team he owned, Chennai Super Kings.
The best example of this ongoing tussle is related to the number of players that could be retained by the eight original teams after the end of IPL-3. Since the players were purchased for three years, many of them would be available for repurchase after the end of the third season.
On March 22, 2009, at an IPL governing council meeting, Modi explained that all the players should be available for fresh auctions. This, according to him, was to ensure that once IPL added two new teams in 2010, “the new owners were not disadvantaged vis-à-vis old teams”.
Srinivasan thought this would serve the interests of franchisees like Rajasthan and Punjab. He maintained that the interests of all owners should be protected. Given this face-off, the council decided to initiate discussions with the existing team owners.
At an IPL workshop in Bangkok on November 11, 2009, it was revealed that six of the eight original teams favoured Modi’s proposal. The two that were against the auction of all players were Chennai Super Kings and Mumbai Indians.
Srinivasan opposed the move again in Bangkok. On December 17, 2009, Modi said in the reply to the first show-cause notice, at the next meeting of the Council, the BCCI secretary “insisted on a player retention policy of seven players (four Indian and three foreign)”.
On March 7, 2010, the council approved the retention of seven players by each of the original eight city teams. “I was… overruled because of strong opposition from the Hon. Secretary whose stand – which was against the interest of the BCCI/IPL, but in his personal interest as a team owner – was supported by the President,” stated Modi in his reply.
After Modi’s ouster, BCCI decided to allow the retention of four players. Only Chennai Super Kings, owned by Srinivasan, and Mumbai Indians retained the maximum number of players allowed under this policy. Some of the teams did not even retain one player.
