 "India opts for sobriety as Bangladesh blames Pak's ISI for Dhaka attacks")
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s studied, sober reaction on the 26/11-type attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh, is aimed to ensure Prime Minister Hasina of the Awami League is not destabilised.
The attack could rewrite not only relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh but also Pakistan and India. For, on Monday, minister after minister in Bangladesh charged that it was Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and not members of the Iraq-based Islamic State (IS or Daesh) that was responsible for the attack.
This brings to the fore, the troubled relations between Hasina’s government and the Pak establishment since the former decided to punish, including by hanging, those considered responsible for atrocities during the war for the creation of Bangladesh. Hasina’s government has also plunged into a crackdown against Islamic fundamentalists in Bangladesh, especially against elements of the Jamaat-e-Islami, partner of the major opposition party led by her predecessor as PM, Khaleda Zia, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).
In recent years, Hasina’s government has adequately addressed India’s security concerns. The recent extradition to India of United Liberation Front of Asom (Ulfa) general secretary Anoop Chetia, seeking political asylum in Bangladesh, is one example. Earlier, Bangladesh had handed over Ulfa chief Arabinda Rajkhowa to India.
The highlight of Modi’s visit to Bangladesh (June 6-7, 2015) was the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA), whose provisions were agreed to as early as 1974 but successive governments in India could not push its ratification in Parliament for a variety of reasons. These included the reservations from the governments of West Bengal and Assam. The manner in which Modi mobilised opinion at Centre and states, especially in those two, facilitating unanimous passage of the 100th Constitution Amendment Bill, paving the way for Parliament ratification of the 1974 agreement and its Protocol of 2011, broke a lot of reservations on the Bangladesh side.
Not only does the LBA settle the 4,096-km of boundary between the two countries and give a new identity to around 50,000 persons in Indian/Bangladesh enclaves on the other side. It also offers a way on effective border management to check insurgents, human trafficking, illegal migration, smuggling, etc.
Bangladesh agreed, in the course of Modi’s visit, to provide transit through its territory for trade and travel. This will significantly improve connectivity between the northeast and other parts of India, hitherto dependent on the narrow and vulnerable Siliguri Corridor, termed ‘Chicken's Neck’. The Dhaka-Shillong-Guwahati and Kolkata-Dhaka-Agartala bus services are expected to boost land connectivity in the region. The Coastal Shipping Agreement will shave time for cargo movement. India will now be able to use the Chittagong and Mongla ports of Bangladesh. Little wonder, then, that there was disquiet in Pakistan on these developments. That India refrained from gloating over its gains in Bangladesh helped Hasina dispel fears of Indian hegemony and consolidation of forces opposed to India.
Even so, if there was a logic to Hasina’s moves, her aggressive campaign to control Islamic radicalism was bound to have a counter-reaction. Interestingly, while ministers in Bangladesh are giving vent to ire against Pakistan, Gowher Rizvi, adviser to the prime minister's office in Dhaka, has issued a statement that the government there does not believe Pakistan or the ISI had any role in the attack.
There is little or no parliamentary opposition to Hasina, as the BNP and Jamaat boycotted the earlier elections. However, the extra-parliamentary opposition to her is formidable. India’s low-profile reaction to events in this part of the subcontinent has to be seen in this light.
The attack could rewrite not only relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh but also Pakistan and India. For, on Monday, minister after minister in Bangladesh charged that it was Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and not members of the Iraq-based Islamic State (IS or Daesh) that was responsible for the attack.
This brings to the fore, the troubled relations between Hasina’s government and the Pak establishment since the former decided to punish, including by hanging, those considered responsible for atrocities during the war for the creation of Bangladesh. Hasina’s government has also plunged into a crackdown against Islamic fundamentalists in Bangladesh, especially against elements of the Jamaat-e-Islami, partner of the major opposition party led by her predecessor as PM, Khaleda Zia, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).
In recent years, Hasina’s government has adequately addressed India’s security concerns. The recent extradition to India of United Liberation Front of Asom (Ulfa) general secretary Anoop Chetia, seeking political asylum in Bangladesh, is one example. Earlier, Bangladesh had handed over Ulfa chief Arabinda Rajkhowa to India.
The highlight of Modi’s visit to Bangladesh (June 6-7, 2015) was the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA), whose provisions were agreed to as early as 1974 but successive governments in India could not push its ratification in Parliament for a variety of reasons. These included the reservations from the governments of West Bengal and Assam. The manner in which Modi mobilised opinion at Centre and states, especially in those two, facilitating unanimous passage of the 100th Constitution Amendment Bill, paving the way for Parliament ratification of the 1974 agreement and its Protocol of 2011, broke a lot of reservations on the Bangladesh side.
Not only does the LBA settle the 4,096-km of boundary between the two countries and give a new identity to around 50,000 persons in Indian/Bangladesh enclaves on the other side. It also offers a way on effective border management to check insurgents, human trafficking, illegal migration, smuggling, etc.
Bangladesh agreed, in the course of Modi’s visit, to provide transit through its territory for trade and travel. This will significantly improve connectivity between the northeast and other parts of India, hitherto dependent on the narrow and vulnerable Siliguri Corridor, termed ‘Chicken's Neck’. The Dhaka-Shillong-Guwahati and Kolkata-Dhaka-Agartala bus services are expected to boost land connectivity in the region. The Coastal Shipping Agreement will shave time for cargo movement. India will now be able to use the Chittagong and Mongla ports of Bangladesh. Little wonder, then, that there was disquiet in Pakistan on these developments. That India refrained from gloating over its gains in Bangladesh helped Hasina dispel fears of Indian hegemony and consolidation of forces opposed to India.
Even so, if there was a logic to Hasina’s moves, her aggressive campaign to control Islamic radicalism was bound to have a counter-reaction. Interestingly, while ministers in Bangladesh are giving vent to ire against Pakistan, Gowher Rizvi, adviser to the prime minister's office in Dhaka, has issued a statement that the government there does not believe Pakistan or the ISI had any role in the attack.
There is little or no parliamentary opposition to Hasina, as the BNP and Jamaat boycotted the earlier elections. However, the extra-parliamentary opposition to her is formidable. India’s low-profile reaction to events in this part of the subcontinent has to be seen in this light.
