 "A security jawan stands guard on 49th day of curfew and stirke in Srinagar")
In my experience, proffering the idea that Pakistan should abandon its quest for Kashmir is generally rewarded with condescension. Tell self-styled foreign policy experts of this hair-brained scheme, and you are met with the rhetorical equivalent of a patronising pat on the shoulder; one is not considered anti-national so much as naive, not unpatriotic but unserious. In the real world of power politics, these strategic gurus tell us woolly-headed fools, states do not abandon their national interests, they fight for them — by hook or crook. Pakistan is no different. In this view, Kashmir is a vital symbolic and strategic interest, tied to both Pakistan’s foundational religious nationalism as well as its geopolitical goals. As such, it needs to continue the political, diplomatic, and yes, military struggle for Kashmir, no different to how big and small countries have fought for their interests for centuries. It’s Realism 101, kid.
Without getting mired in the intricacies of Realist theory, it is worth considering, from a realpolitik perspective, just how sensible Pakistan’s longstanding desire for Kashmir is. The costs of Pakistan’s existing strategy in Kashmir are well known and do not require extensive elaboration. On the security front, it has bred terrorism which has claimed over 50,000 citizens since 9/11. Politically, it has helped cement the army’s hold over the country, hindering the development of representative institutions. Pakistan’s economy has suffered due to this. Extremism and militant violence affect domestic and foreign investment, while the military’s dominance in politics ensures crowding out of spending on public goods, such as education, in favour of plots and pensions for generals. Finally, insofar as diplomacy is concerned, Pakistan’s revisionism leads to isolation and opprobrium, even from its friends. In contrast to these substantial costs, the tangible gains to Pakistan of its Kashmir strategy are difficult to locate: the territorial status-quo in Kashmir has not significantly changed in close to seven decades, despite repeated attempts. For a strategy pushed by so-called realists, such a balance of costs and benefits is surely puzzling.
By contrast, consider a world in which Pakistan was satisfied with “West Kashmir,” so to speak. It is a matter of pure conjecture what such a world would look like. Nevertheless, three expectations seem reasonable. First, the state would make more of an effort to target militant groups in its midst, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, that severely compromise its writ. Second, the incidence of crises that threaten the nuclear annihilation of hundreds of millions of South Asians would transition from regular to rare. Third, the sharpest thorn in Indo-Pak relations would be removed.
In turn, an improved relationship with India would dramatically benefit Pakistan. India’s sheer size ensures that the economic base upon which it builds its military power – the ultima ratio in realism – will always be bigger than its substantially smaller neighbour’s. When one juxtaposes the trajectory of each country’s GDP since independence, it becomes clear just how irresponsible challenging India in the long-run is. Ensuring that Pakistan’s next seventy years are not marked with enmity with India to the same extent as the previous seventy should be the foremost priority of Pakistani strategists.
Of course, one should be careful to not overstate the case. Just because Kashmir is the biggest issue dividing India and Pakistan does not mean it is the only one. As the two most powerful countries in South Asia, all realists can safely agree that it is almost natural for the pair to butt heads. Aspiring regional hegemons, a description that assuredly fits India, should not be expected to enjoy the subservience of secondary powers. In other words, even without revisionism over Kashmir, it is unlikely that Pakistan would enjoy a strong friendship with India, or anything close.
But there is a meaningful difference between obeying the baseline level of security competition expected in international politics, on the one hand, and blasting distantly past that baseline due to one’s own irrational goals, on the other. That Pakistan’s relationship with India would not be perfect in the absence of the Kashmir issue is no reason to ignore the vast benefits that would accrue to it through the relative “normalisation” of ties. Argentina and Brazil serve as an imperfect but useful analogy. At loggerheads for over a century, Brazil today is comfortably Argentina’s largest trade partner, even while the latter opposes the former’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (sound familiar?). Northeast Asia is the site of squabbles over territory and textbooks, yes, but China is also Japan’s second-largest export destination and the country from which it imports more than any other. Even in sub-Saharan Africa, hardly a region known for interconnectedness, Somalia’s top import supplier is Ethiopia, despite strained relations between the countries for decades.
Aside from realist considerations, one might oppose Pakistan’s abandoning of Kashmir on humanitarian grounds. Though realists do not, as a general rule, concern themselves with humanitarian causes, the question is worth posing: should Pakistan not speak for the rights of the Kashmiri nation, crushed by the Indian state at various times since 1947? By all means, Pakistan should object to human rights violations it finds objectionable. But it bears noting that few countries enjoy the moral high-ground concerning Kashmiris’ well-being less than Pakistan. Its numerous armed interventions in Kashmir, from the war in 1947-48 to the one in 1965, from the 1989-1994 insurgency to Kargil, have intensified the violence Kashmiris face, and made their freedom less likely. My own research has shown that when third-parties get involved in separatist disputes in rival countries, they invite nothing but trouble and repression for the secessionist group. As such, if Pakistan is genuinely motivated by a concern for Kashmiris’ welfare, its best course would be to cease demanding, and working towards,their accession. From a consequently more neutral position, Pakistan’s political and diplomatic support for Kashmiri rights and autonomy would carry more weight in multilateral and regional fora.
Of course, the least “realist” element of the above strategy is that it is not very realistic: it is exceedingly unlikely that Pakistan will abandon its demand for Kashmir in the immediate or medium terms. As long as Pakistan’s foreign and defence policies are in the hands of its army, the state is beholden to a view that considers the territory its vital national interest. But my purpose here is not prediction but prescription. I believe that abandoning the desire for Kashmir would serve the national interests of Pakistan, a goal all Pakistani realists share, as well as the interests of the Kashmiri people and the cause of peace on the subcontinent, which are wider, more humanist concerns.
The author teaches at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. His main research interests lie in nationalism, international security, and South Asia.
