Three countries that China views with a proprietorial air in the Asia-Pacific region will be hosted and courted by India this month.
It could be a coincidence — but equally, it might not — that the President of Vietnam, Truong Tan Sang; the new President of Myanmar Thein Sein; and the new Prime Minister of Nepal, Baburam Bhattarai, will all have visited New Delhi in October.
Beijing recently had words with New Delhi over its plans for oil exploration in what China considers its territorial waters, off the coast of Vietnam.
In an act of self-assertion, on September 30, President Thein of Myanmar ordered work on the Myitsone dam on the Irrawaddy river to stop, following public protests on the grounds that the dam threatened the flow of the river. Immediately after, China asked Myanmar to protect the rights of Chinese companies. (The project is worth $3.6 billion and is being built by Chinese companies). Although analysts say Thein’s India visit should not be seen as a riposte to China and say the vice-president of Myanmar will visit Beijing later in the month to sort things out, ONGC Videsh, the overseas arm of state-run Oil and Natural Gas Corp, has extensive plans for oil exploration in Myanmar as well.
The Nepalese PM recently declared that he would like Nepal to unite South Asia and China. “Nepal would like to act like a vibrant bridge between these two historic regions, rather than the traditional buffer state,” he said. While his predecessor, Jhalanath Khanal, did not visit India in his entire tenure, Bhattarai is now being feted by India. Bhattarai’s party colleague Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) was considered by China to be an ally and friend. Bhattarai is seen as much more moderate and favourably disposed towards India.
Myanmar would be happy to do business and have closer relations with India but the logistics don’t allow this. China has a natural geographical advantage. But the military junta, which has ruled Myanmar for over 30 years, considers the challenge from the complex militant tribal societies on the Myanmar-China border as the biggest factor hindering the growth and development of nationhood in Myanmar. For this reason, it has viewed China with suspicion, especially the settlements along the border of Konkang on the Myanmar side and Yunnan on the Chinese side. In the past, China has tried to broker peace deals between Myanmar and the tribal groups. But not everyone in the Myanmar military — and certainly not in the civilian government — believes China is an honest broker.
Geography has placed impediments on normalising relations with India, especially economic relations. “The problem with India’s energy interests in Myanmar is that even if it develops A1 to A7 energy blocks or any other offshore Bay of Bengal blocks, how will be it be transported back to India? At present, we only hold a 30 per cent stake in A1 and A3 blocks, and that too we are forced to sell to China because of the absence of a proper pipeline between India and Myanmar,” says former foreign secretary Shyam Saran.
President Thein is the civilian president of the country after Myanmar’s strongman, Gen Than Shwe, has stepped aside, letting a nominally civilian government assume power, but without relinquishing the real levers of political control. Thus, Thein comes to India against a backdrop of a currently stable civil-military equilibrium in his country, but one that could face imbalance any time.
With Vietnam, India has signed a number of agreements during the President’s current visit that could irritate China. These include an agreement on cooperation between Vietnam Oil and Gas Group (Petro Vietnam) and ONGC Videsh Ltd in the oil and gas sector, underlining the two countries’ intention to proceed in a direction that China is already annoyed about.
But from India’s point of view, a crucial visit where the India-China matrix will be put under test is Bhattarai’s. India’s relations with Nepal have been on a cusp for some time, owing to a disturbed internal political situation in Nepal. While China’s stakes in the management of its relations with Nepal are lower, it is conscious that it needs Nepalese help to manage dissidence in Tibet. Although there has been no significant fall in asylum-seekers travelling to Nepal from Tibet (suggesting a Maoist-led government in Kathmandu has not really helped the Chinese establishment in shackling dissidence), observers say this could be a fallout of lack of capacity rather than lack of intent. Nepal has become one of the biggest dumping grounds for cheap Chinese goods in the region in recent years.
Amid the imperatives unleashed by India’s own economic growth, New Delhi would like to see balance in its relations with China. But recent moves suggest it is not ready to become a doormat.
