The deployment is complete, the war room, we're told, has been readied. The Army and Air Force are all dressed up. But do they know where to go?
Not really. Military analysts say what India is doing is threatening war, itself a legitimate form of coercive diplomacy. But as for war itself... well, that's something "we have to talk about".
First, by carrying out full-scale deployment, any element of initial tactical surprise for overt or covert action along the Line of Control has been lost. What exists on the Line of Control (LoC) and the International Border is hot war deployment which makes a breakthrough in ground operations difficult.
Cross-border infiltration was the cause for another war India fought against Pakistan. Pakistan carried out a testing operation in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965, followed by full deployment on both sides. This was called Op ABLAZE.
Cease-fire was brokered by the UK but all troops did not return to the barracks because, in August, Pakistan launched Operation Gibralter which was a full-scale infiltration by Pak Army regulars into J&K led by Maj Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik GoC POK. India retaliated by crossing the LoC and occupying the infiltration launch pad at Haji Pir and Kishanganga Bulge. This, in turn, led to Pakistan launching Operation Grand Slam at Chhamb Jaurian and India's Op Riddle when India crossed the international border opposite Sialkot and Lahore. This marked the declaration of war.
There are striking similarities between that situation and now -- but only to the extent that the objective of that engagement was putting a stop to cross-border infiltration. However, the entire 1965 war was strongly predicated on the element of surprise, which is missing now, thus, severely curtailing the Army's options.
Similarly, in 1971, while the Indian Army took nine months to build up its forces on the border of East Pakistan, Indira Gandhi and other leaders carried out a massive global diplomatic offensive, travelling all over the world to inform countries about the crimes against humanity, genocide in East Pakistan and the problem of millions of refugees who were pouring into India. It was India which chose the time to launch the offensive. The timing of the war was not thrust upon the Indian Army.
Today, unlike the 1971 situation when the Pakistan Army was deeply engaged in East Pakistan, only two corps of the Pak Army -- the 11 and 12 Corps located at Peshawar and Quetta, respectively, are deployed at the Durand Line. The LoC and the international border are fully covered with defensive and offensive forces. In the circumstances, barring surgical air strikes, the utility of which is questionable, no decisive ground operations are feasible despite India's military edge.
Top Army sources feel that it is simply not possible to retake Pakistan Occupied Kashmir because of difficulties of terrain and the current pattern of troop deployment. Nor is that a politico-military objective. Till yesterday, all foreign minister Jaswant Singh would say was that India wanted "recognition" of the seriousness of the December 13 episode by Pakistan. He refused to spell out a timetable for this "recognition". Nor is there any timetable or deadline spelt out for ending cross-border terrorism.
But the threat of war is there for all to see. For India, the best case scenario is that the anxiety to prevent war will induce the US to carry out India's counter-terrorism agenda within Pakistan and PoK, without a shot being fired on either side. Deployment can continue for the next six months without undermining the security on India's other borders. During this period it is expected that the coalition against terrorism -- of which Pakistan is a member -- will intervene to bring Pakistan to heel.
