US assistant secretary of state for South & Central Asia Robert Blake flew straight from Thimphu to Beijing (via Dhaka and Bangkok) to attend the second round of the US-China Sub-Dialogue on South Asia along with his counterpart, Chinese vice-minister Wang Guangya, on May 4, an indication of rising US acceptance of Chinese interest and jurisdiction over South Asia.
Both Blake and Wang were in Thimphu last week to represent their countries as “observers” to the SAARC summit, at which the Chinese representative promised to “elevate friendly ties” (with SAARC) “to a new level” and offered a Chinese contribution of $300,000 to the SAARC Development Fund.
In fact, none other than US President Barack Obama has encouraged Chinese interest in South Asia. After his meeting with Chinese president Hu Jintao in Beijng in November 2009, China and the US pledged to “strengthen communication, dialogue and cooperation on issues related to South Asia.”
Indian officials were furious at the phrasing of the communiqué at the time, especially since the ink on the Indo-US nuclear deal agreement had barely dried. It reminded Delhi of the Bill Clinton-Jian Zemin statement of 1998, which in the wake of India’s nuclear tests, also promised closer coordination. But if the 1998 statement was limited to nuclear issues, the 2009 Obama-Hu statement clearly gave Beijing a pre-eminent position in Asia.
This week’s follow-up of the Sino-US dialogue has been followed closely in South Block and raised several eyebrows, but following the India-Pakistan return to its own talks in Thimphu and the recent, successful visit of External Affairs minister SM Krishna to Beijing, diplomats in Delhi are warily holding their peace.
In Beijing, the focus of the Blake-Wang conversation was said to be on Afghanistan. The Americans have been keen that China plays a more active role in that country. An offer to the Chinese to train the Afghan police is on the table, and Beijing is believed to have shown some interest on this score. So far, though, the Chinese are shying away from sending soldiers on the ground, insisting they will re-look at the situation only after the US-NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Srikanth Kondapalli, professor of Chinese studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University pointed out that that the Americans have been “very impressed with the Chinese dealing of the North Korean nuclear issue” and wanted Beijing to play a more active role on Teheran’s nuclear issue as well.
Kondapalli said the April meeting between Hu and Obama at the nuclear security summit in Washington has “yielded a lot of ground” both on AfPak matters as well as on closer coordination on Teheran.
Clearly, China’s “all-weather” relationship with Pakistan, its close ties with the Pakistan army and the ISI, seems to have also persuaded the US that it should persuade Beijing to move beyond its focus on exploitation of natural resources – such as the buying up of the Aynak copper mine in Afghanistan for $2 billion – and play a more strategic role in the AfPak region.
Chinese oversight in the AfPak region, the Americans believe, will not allow Pakistan from overplaying its hand as well as prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of the Taliban.
Meanwhile, a difference of opinion seems to be building between the US and China over the question of Beijing promising two civilian nuclear power plants to Pakistan. While it is not clear whether this subject was discussed in the US-China dialogue on South Asia, Blake was quoted as saying on its margins that China would have to seek an “exception” from the Nuclear Suppliers Group if it wanted to supply those two reactors.
On the face of it, the strong anti-nuclear credentials of the Obama administration would imply that it would be very difficult for Beijing to get NSG permission for a nuclear deal for Pakistan, on the lines of the Indo-US nuclear deal.
Details of Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khan’s illegal sales of nuclear knowhow and equipment to Iran and Libya, among others, have hugely dented Islamabad’s reputation and if the Americans don’t push Pakistan’s case – as they did with Delhi – Chinese attempts at imitating the Indo-US nuclear deal with Pakistan may come a-cropper.
However, government sources pointed out that “Pakistan’s central importance in the Af-Pak great game could result in a softening of the US position.” Moreover, the sources said, a possible trade-off over Chinese support for US sanctions at the UN Security Council could be on the cards.
Even as Blake pointed to the need to take the NSG on board, Chinese officials argued that the two new nuclear power plants, Chashma-3 and Chashma-4 would only be “grandfathering” two previous nuclear plants, Chashma-1 and Chashma-2 (both 325 MW), for which the NSG had earlier given an exception.
China’s National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) had last month stated that China had signed a deal with Pakistan for two nuclear power plants of 340 MW each, worth $2.3 billion.
Clearly, the “grandfather” clause is a reference to the Russian sale of two 1000 MW civilian nuclear reactors to India, being built in Kudamkulam in Tamil Nadu, and likely to go onstream this year. The original agreement to sell the two reactors was signed between Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev and former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1989, but after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Russians came under enormous pressure not to follow-through. In 1996, however, Moscow and Delhi signed a “supplement” to the 1989 agreement, for the supply of two plants at Kudamkulam, essentially “grandfathering” the 1989 deal.
However, it seems as if the Americans are also aware of India’s prickliness over the Obama administration’s “ceding” of primacy to China in Asia, and has offered a parallel dialogue with India, even as the US and China continue their own primary strategic dialogue. Deputy assistant secretary of state Kurt Campbell was in Delhi last month, offering a series of meetings.
