The death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il has raised two significant questions: whether the leadership transition will be smooth, and to what extent the international power balance will be altered in Northeast Asia.
Since the end of the Cold War, the security dynamics of Northeast Asia have largely been reflected by the strategic environment of the Korean Peninsula — with North and South Korea, China, the United States, Russia and Japan acting as the key players. These actors have used mediation, compromises and trade-offs over Pyongyang’s military provocations and nuclear programs as tools for leverage. Meanwhile, a multilateral approach to Pyon-gyang has protected the common interest to maintain stability amid such uncertain times as the ongoing transition from Kim Jong Il to his successor.
“Despite the initial sense of a stable transition, North Korea’s foreign policy direction remains hard to predict. For now, none of the other players involved seem willing to exploit the situation in a way that might exacerbate tensions in the region.”
Pyongyang’s handling of Kim Jong Il’s death — allowing two days before leaking the news and assuming no unexpected military postures — suggests that North Korea has an interest and the capability to manage an orderly transition, at least for the moment. It may take months for the new leader Kim Jong Un and his regime to consolidate power enough to resume the old military provocations, since any international response to provocation could hamper a nascent regime.
Despite the initial sense of a stable transition, North Korea’s foreign policy direction remains hard to predict. For now, none of the other players involved seem willing to exploit the situation in a way that might exacerbate tensions in the region. The main attitude seems to be one of waiting. South Korea announced emergency meetings in the National Assembly and set its military to emergency status. Japan set up a crisis management team. China, while surely concerned about losing its prominent role in Pyongyang’s affairs, sent its condolences to the country, and Washington issued a statement saying it was monitoring North Korea for signs of instability or unusual military moves.
China
Beijing, which is North Korea’s longstanding ally and is believed to retain considerable influence on Pyongyang’s politics, is concerned that the regime, in the absence of Kim Jong Il, may undertake policy directions that could undermine China’s leverage. China and North Korea have maintained an alliance since the Korean War sixty years ago, when Kim Jong Il’s father, Kim Il Sung, cemented his personal dictatorship. North Korea is a critical component of China’s buffer strategy, a relationship that Beijing uses as an important card in the multilateral negotiations, especially with Washington. China is concerned that a North Korean collapse scenario could cause the potential loss of a strategic buffer and the more temporal concern of a possible refugee crisis along the Chinese border. In recent years, Beijing appears to have been caught off guard by some of Pyongyang’s provocative acts, which have undermined the credibility of Beijing’s status as a mediator. Therefore, it is in Beijing’s fundamental interest to ensure a smooth transition in North Korea without triggering instability or causing Pyongyang to shift course.
Over the past several years, and especially following Kim Jong Il’s stroke in 2008, China has substantially increased economic ties with North Korea, expanding its role as the lifeline of the North Korean regime and state. As economic relations have intensified, so has Beijing’s leverage among North Korea’s political elite. Beijing has intensified its involvement with various elements of the North Korean elite structure, seeking to enhance its knowledge of internal North Korean machinations and broadening its base of relations and support within the regime. Beijing will now draw on these resources to try to manage any potential disruptions to the power transfer. Beijing may not know Kim Jong Un, but it knows other elements within the North Korean regime, and the young Kim is unlikely to wield real power any time soon. China’s basic security interests will benefit from a smooth transition, while also providing Beijing an opportunity to increase its influence over the North Korean regime.
Russia
Russia holds far fewer levers in North Korea capable of managing any problems that may arise during the succession. According to a STRATFOR source in the Kremlin, a smooth transition could help Moscow increase its influence in North Korean affairs in the long run, as Pyongyang seeks to balance China’s deepening involvement in its affairs. Moscow understands that Pyongyang sits in China’s primary sphere, so Russia naturally has less leverage. The succession from Kim Jong Il not only allows Moscow to build its leverage with Pyongyang, it also fits in Russia’s broader strategy to return to greater involvement in the Asia-Pacific region. Moscow perceives South Korea as a critical component of that strategy. Russia wants to open a corridor that provides direct access to South Korea through proposed natural gas and railway projects, but its plans with Seoul remain far off. Regional stability is essential to spur them forward.
South Korea and Japan
The leadership transition in North Korea creates for Seoul a moment of uncertainty. Like China, South Korea is wary of any sudden collapse on the part of North Korea. Seoul fears both a potential refugee crisis and the unpredictable behavior of North Korean armed forces if the regime feels it is losing its grip. However, the death of Kim Jong Il also comes at a time of increasing political friction inside South Korea. In the near term, events north of the border may distract from the political woes of the ruling Grand National Party. Over the next year, it may allow President Lee Myung Bak to try to capitalize on the instability by offering a more open hand to North Korea — deflecting some of the domestic criticism aimed at his North Korea policy and drawing attention away from other domestic political issues. In Japan, the fear of North Korean collapse is lower than in China and South Korea, which share an immediate border. Tokyo, however, is also taking a wait-and-see approach.
The United States
Debate in the United States will center around whether to use the leadership transition as an opportunity to push forward talks with the North, or to assume a stricter stance and try to pressure the incoming leader. In both cases, the question will focus on the U.S. interpretation of the North Korean leader’s likely next steps. On one hand, there is speculation that Kim Jong Un, given his young age and unproven record, will be forced to undertake an early show of aggression to demonstrate his resolve at home and abroad. Those who subscribe to this interpretation think that pressure on North Korea should be intensified, not slackened. The counterargument contends that this regime will in fact be a continuation of the last, but that as the impact of generational changes expands, chances improve for a more peaceful reshaping of North Korean policy. In either case, Washington is unlikely to push North Korea too hard, as it wishes to avoid a military crisis in the region and has far more pressing issues on its plate.
The nations surrounding North Korea seem to share at least one thing in common with the North Korean leadership as the latter pushes forward in its leadership transition: a desire to avoid any breakdown and immediate collapse of the North Korean system. A breakdown could escalate tensions between the involved parties and increase chances for possible miscalculations.
Reprinted with permission from www. Stratfor.com
