As Mahinda Rajapaksa settles down to governing Sri Lanka after his landslide victory in Tuesday’s presidential elections, India is already gearing up to seize the historical moment that is presenting itself in the new administration.
Although Delhi was stoutly neutral in the run-up to the polls, the fact that it had heavily invested in Rajapaksa over the last many months, and refused to publicly censure him over the human rights violations against Tamil civilians in the last days of the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) last May, vindicates the government’s analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Sri Lanka’s major players.
The new Indian initiative is expected to revolve around an integrated settlement of the Tamil question, that has been festering for the last 25 years since the LTTE launched a civil war by murdering not only mainstream Sinhala politicians but also moderate Tamil leaders, a new economic agenda as well as a brand new defence relationship that could transform Indo-Sri Lanka relations in the years to come.
As in most democracies, the figures in the Sri Lanka election tells part of the story: Rajapakse won an astounding 57.88 per cent of the vote, received 6.01 million votes, 1.84 million more than his rival, former army commander Sarath Fonseka, and in fact defeated Fonseka in his hometown of Ambalangoda.
What is even more interesting is that Rajapakse not only, expectedly, secured more than 60 per cent of the votes in the Sinhala-dominated south, including in his native Hambantota, but also in the hill country where Indian-origin Tamils work as plantation labour on the tea estates, like in Nuwara Eliya and Kandy. He also won in Tissamanahara, considered to be the stronghold of the extreme right-wing Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party.
In fact, Rajapakse’s victory is also considerably sweetened by his wins in parts of the Tamil-dominated north, in places like Vavuniya and even Trincomalee.
But as he basks in the afterglow of his victory and receives several congratulatory messages, including from President Pratibha Patil, Indian officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity said the time had come for both countries to take their bilateral relationship to new heights.
“The second Rajapakse administration will usher in a new phase in the bilateral relationship,” the officials said, but cautioned that the big thrust would likely only come after parliamentary polls in April.
On top of the bilateral agenda is the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (Cepa), languishing since the middle of 2007, as well as the attendant economic restructuring of Trincomalee. Two thermal power plants of 250 Mw each are ready to be built in Trincomalee and Delhi has long been ready with the idea of integrating the southern electricity grid with northern Sri Lanka.
The economic stiffening of Delhi’s diplomatic moves is part of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s strategy of using India’s economic growth as a stimulus for the poorer parts of South Asia. Although Sri Lanka’s socio-economic indicators are much better than India in several areas (it has 89 per cent literacy, for example), the Tamil-dominated north and eastern provinces are singularly deprived.
The reintegration of the Tamils into the political mainstream will also be closely watched by Delhi. With the LTTE having practically finished off the moderate Tamil leadership, and several thousand Tamils fled the northern peninsula, especially from Jaffna, analysts said the new Rajapakse government would have to move especially “delicately, but surely” to see that the so-called Tamil-Sinhala divide was not exacerbated after the president’s sweeping victory.
Speaking on the phone from Chennai, N Sathiyamoorthy of the Observer Research Foundation admitted that most people were taken aback by Rajapaksa’s large gains. “Expectations are high that he will now make special overtures towards the Tamils, and move in the direction of implementing the 13th amendment that was part of the 1987 Sri Lanka accord,” he said. The 13th amendment, which has become symbolic of the need for a federal structure, calls for amending the unitary nature of the Constitution, and instituting a bicameral legislature.
But it is in the area of reinventing defence relations between India and Sri Lanka, a taboo subject since the ignonimous return of the Indian peace-keeping forces in 1990 from Sri Lanka, that both countries could surprise themselves, said analysts.
A complete freeze on selling arms to Colombo because of the fear that they could be used to kill Tamils in the war against the LTTE -- which would have its own political repercussions on Tamil politics in India -- meant that several Sri Lankan governments have had to buy sophisticated weaponry from China and Pakistan over the last 20 years.
All that could change if India lifts its self-imposed ban, allowing Rajapakse to stop flirting with Beijing as well as Islamabad.
Officials, in fact, pointed out that the common criticism about Rajapakse allowing the Chinese to build a port in his hometown Hambantota, was hardly valid since the Sri Lankan president had actually first made the same offer to India. But Delhi took so long to decide that Rajapakse then turned to Beijing for help.
