Rs 44,000 crore have been spent in the last six years on the purchase of weapons systems, but these will not even replace, much less augment, the fast-ageing inventory.
Starting from a handful of Ordnance factories which produced the most basic arms and ammunition, India now boasts of factories and shipyards which produce fighter aircraft, helicopters, tanks, mechanised vehicles, ships and submarines and a host of sophisticated equipment that gets fitted in these platforms. Add to this, missiles like the Prithvi, Agni and Brahmos and a nuclear submarine and an aircraft carrier under construction, and the logical conclusion should be that things are in good shape. But there is also bad news. Several high-profile projects of indigenous development have either floundered (Trishul) or continue to move sluggishly (the Light Combat Aircraft). Even the Arjun Tank, developed over three decades, is well short of expectation, its acceptance by the Army in limited numbers being just a compromise. The submarine building programme initiated in the early 1990s came to an abrupt halt following allegations of bribery, with consequent inactivity that has lasted more than a decade. Indigenous production of 155 mm guns for the Army, which was to follow the initial purchase of Bofors guns, also came to grief for the same reason. Nearly Rs 44,000 crores have been spent in the last six years on purchase of platforms and weapons systems, but these will not even replace, much less augment, the fast-ageing inventory.
The Armed Forces require modern weapons systems that are in tune with threat perceptions. For this, they have to indicate their quantitative and qualitative requirements. The ball then shifts to the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which includes its administrative wing and the departments of production (DPS) and of research and development (DRDO). A critical decision has now to be made — Buy, or Buy-and-Make, or Make. It is here that a pragmatic assessment of own capabilities and cost-benefit analyses have to be made. Some projects are clearly of the Buy type — P8I, C130J or C17 aircraft; these platforms are either few and will not justify costly investment in creating local capabilities to build them, or their technology might not be available except through straight import. Others, involving higher numbers, such as multi-role aircraft and helicopters, or ships and submarines, are better suited to a Make-and-Buy decision with transfer of technology which can be improved upon progressively.
DRDO activists oppose this on the basis that what is transferred is ‘Know-How’ and not ‘Know-Why’. While this is true in a sense, it is necessary to differentiate between those needs where the first option will be enough, and others, especially in critical technologies, where the latter is essential. Timely availability must also be given weightage. Many of the most successful indigenous building programmes promoting self-reliance have been of the first type — for example, construction of two submarines at the shipyard in Mumbai following outright purchase of two. We ran similar projects for the MiG-21 and Jaguar aircraft and are doing the same for the T72 upgrades and T90S tanks and BMPs and building of frigates and destroyers in Mumbai, starting from the first such ship built entirely with imported know-how three decades ago.
The third option, ‘Make’, must be reserved for either highly sensitive items, such as electronic warfare equipment and cryogenic engines, for which technology might not be made available, or for things for which there is proven capability to deliver within the desired time frame. In all cases, quick decision making is essential so that the projects do not drag on. But it remains elusive; every year, over the last eight years, the MoD has surrendered amounts voted for modernisation. The average annual surrender of about 17 per cent over the decade amounts to a staggering Rs 34,000 crores. This is pathetic, considering that the allocation for modernisation is itself so meagre.
Politics has also played spoiler in defence procurement. When the HDW submarine scandal broke in 1987, all further dealings were scrapped and the firm was blacklisted. Two decades later, not even a charge-sheet could be filed against anyone, but the indigenous build programme has remained stuck. The same has been the case with Bofors. No acquisitions have taken place since the mid-1980s, and the 155 mm guns that came under the contract are now more than 20 years old. Recently, a Singapore-based firm, with whom fresh procurement of 155 mm guns was being processed, was blacklisted. This inability to distinguish between need for the product and the supplier’s ‘integrity’ has only hurt our own combat readiness. There is need to punish the guilty, which we are unable to do, but to stymie our modernisation process, which we succeed in doing, defies understanding.
In the quest for self-reliance, exploitation and nurturing of an increasingly capable private sector should have had high priority. Several companies like Larsen and Toubro, Walchand, Kirloskar, Voltas, Tata and Mahindra, to name a few, have shown that they can respond to the stringent parameters of military hardware. L&T, for example, has fabricated hull sections of the nuclear submarine, a very complex activity and good sense would suggest that similar work on follow-on boats should be outsourced to it. There is also no reason why this firm and some others should not be given orders to build ships, starting with those which are relatively less technology-intensive. There has been much talk on private participation in defence production in conferences sponsored by FICCI and CII, but walking-the-talk is still just a crawl.
A major stumbling block is the attitude of two major agencies crucially placed in the business of defence procurement — the DRDO and the DPS. Both have consistently resisted ingress of other players in what, for them, has been their domain. DPSUs are also fearful that their own work will show up poorly when compared to the greater efficiency of private sector companies. Sixty years after independence, we are still suspicious of our own private sector companies, but quite comfortable in dealing with those abroad. Surely, self-reliance must mean a combination of all our capabilities, in both public and private sectors.
Yet another impediment in the way to desired defence preparedness lies in the exaggerated claims of both the DRDO and the DPS of capabilities beyond what they actually have. This has caused important projects like the LCA and Trishul missile systems to go on for decades without result and, what is worse, prevented acquisition of equivalents from abroad, thereby denying the Armed Forces some very critically needed weapons systems. Overall performance of DPSUs, with a few exceptions, has been uninspiring, to say the least. For example, Mazagon Docks Ltd in Mumbai will deliver the first Shivalik class frigate this year, more than 10 years after being ordered, despite experience stretching over three decades, when a similar yard abroad produces such ships in four years, even less. The same inefficiency can be seen elsewhere, in production of rifles and tanks, for example.
The reason why productivity should be poor is a separate issue, but it results in seriously eroding combat-readiness. Once it is claimed that the platform can be built locally, and in time, procurement from a foreign source is ruled out. By the time it is obvious that our DPSU will not be able to deliver, it is too late. There should be no hesitation in subscribing to technology collaboration projects in which some platforms are built abroad and the rest in India. This does not detract from the philosophy of self-reliance, which is a means to an end and not the end itself. In fact, this process facilitates absorption of technology and its progressive upgradation indigenously; development of increasingly sophisticated radars at Bharat Electronics after initial import several years ago is one example.
Eight years ago, the MoD, on the advice of a high-powered Task Force, constituted a dedicated Department of Procurement. A Defence Acquisitions Council under the chairmanship of the Defence Minister was also put in place. Defence Procurement Procedures (DPPs) have been formulated and revised, most recently in 2009. Despite this, surrender of funds allotted for modernisation continues. Unless some fundamental course corrections are made, the required combat capability will never be achieved. The chasm between Defence Preparedness and Defence Procurement continues to remain wide. It must be bridged.
The author is a former Director General, Defence Planning Staff. He was also a member of the Task Force constituted in 2000 to review Higher Defence Management
