Pumping oil in a petrol pump is manufacturing process, so ruled the Supreme Court in a very recent judgement. But it is not manufacture under Central
Excise Law. It is manufacture under the Factories Act, 1948. The principle is that the definition is one law is not valid for another law.
Employees’ State Insurance Act 1948 applies to all factories. Petrol pump is a factory by dint of Section 2(12) of this Act because factory means any premises where 10 or more persons are employed for wages and in any part of which a man-ufacturing process is carried out. Now manufacturing process includes pumping oil under Section 2(k)(ii) of the Factories Act 1948. Thus, legally a petrol pump is carrying on manufacturing process. Therefore it is liable to pay contribution under the Employees’ State Insurance Act. After holding this legal position, the Supre-me Court has observed by way of clarification that the word manufacturing process or manufacture does not mean the same thing in all the statutes. The word manufacture under the Central Excise Act means bringing into existence a different commodity, whereas under the Factories Act simply pumping oil becomes a manufacturing process.
To a layman, it is conceptually somewhat difficult to accept that merely pumping petrol in petrol pump is manufacture. But, when the purpose is taken into account, it becomes easy to understand. The idea is to provide insurance cover to the workers when they are more than 10 working in an enterprise where pumping oil or water or sewerage or any other substance is going on. That is why in the Factories Act the definition of manufacturing process is very wide. The definition also includes repairing, refitting, finishing of ship or vessel. This definition includes so many activities which are strictly not manufacture as we understand in common parlance.
Definition goes with the purpose of the Act. A definition in one Act is not applicable in another Act because the purposes are different. The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act has its purpose so wide that practically anything a person puts into his mount comes under its fold. But excise or customs law does not have such wide range of purpose. In Central Excise food is understood in a completely different meaning. Gambier which is a condiment taken with betel leaf is by no means regarded as food by anybody. But gambier is a food under the prevention of Food Adulteration Act because the idea of this Act to prevent food adulteration. Even biscuits or ice cream or cold drinks are not regarded as food in common parlance. So they don’t get the benefit of exemption on food but they are food under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
However, the Bombay High Court has observed[2] that the principle that a definition given to a word or expression in a particular
Act cannot be utilised for the interpretation of a similar word or expression occurring in a different Act is not ‘an absolute principle of law’. Said the Court, ‘generally it is so but in a given case the definition given in a particular statute not being repugnant, may be used to construe and interpret the same expression occurring in another statute. In this Bombay case the popular meaning of drugs for the purpose of excise law and the definition of drugs in the Drugs and
Cosmetics Act are not different and so there was no harm in consulting the definition of the other Act.
