In the middle of what would become the largest automotive recall in American history, the Japanese airbag manufacturer Takata halted global safety audits to save money, according to internal company emails cited in a report published on Monday by a Senate committee.
That order was one of many serious safety lapses at Takata detailed in the report released by Senator Bill Nelson, a Florida Democrat and the ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation.
On Tuesday, a Takata executive is among those scheduled to testify before the committee about its defective airbags, which can unexpectedly rupture and send metal shards flying into a vehicle's cabin.
Takata quickly disputed the report's findings as misleading, however, saying that the emails had been taken out of context. The company said that it had conducted regular reviews of product quality and safety and that the halted global audits referred to in the report related only to worker safety, not product quality or safety.
Last month, Takata admitted that its airbags were defective and vastly expanded the recall of cars equipped with them. Regulators now estimate that about 32 million vehicles are affected, a number slightly lower than the original estimate of nearly 34 million At least eight deaths and more than 100 injuries have been linked to the defect.
According to the committee's report, Takata halted global safety audits at its manufacturing plants in 2009, a year after Honda had started recalling a small number of cars to replace the airbags.
But quality problems plagued at least two Takata plants, the report said: its factory in Monclova, Mexico, which assembled the airbags, and a factory at Moses Lake, Washington, which produced the propellant, or the explosives that helped inflate the airbag.
When Takata eventually restarted the safety audits in 2011, auditors identified quality lapses in the plants, the report said, citing internal company emails. At the Monclova plant, for example, propellant was sometimes left out on the assembly line floor, the report said. Takata has previously said that propellant left out on the floor could become exposed to moisture, making it more unstable.
But those findings were not shared with Takata's headquarters in Tokyo, the report said, citing internal emails from Takata's safety director at the time.
Then, when the safety director returned to the plant months later to conduct a follow-up audit, employees appeared to scramble to create the appearance of a safety committee within the plant.
"No safety committee, as such, has been formed," a superintendent of environmental health and safety wrote in an email.
"We need compelling responses and evidence so that there is no doubt and they don't start asking for this and that," a quality manager replied.
The follow-up audit ultimately identified 14 ways the plant could address concerns at the plant. "The more evidence we see, the more it paints a troubling picture of a manufacturer that lacked concern," Nelson said in a statement.
On Monday, Takata disputed the committee's findings, saying that the report had described the safety audits incorrectly.
"The global audits referenced in the emails relate to the safe handling by employees of pyrotechnic materials - they were not, as the report implies, related to product quality or safety," Takata said in a statement. "Takata conducts regular reviews of product quality and safety at Moses Lake and Monclova, and at no time were those halted."
The report, which was based on 13,000 emails and documents provided by Takata at the request of the committee's minority staff, also found that as recently as 2013, Takata's Monclova plant had made changes to its assembly lines without receiving approval from internal quality, engineering and safety directors.
"Had Takata implemented more robust safety programs, including outside auditing and verification, it is possible that these serious production issues might have been addressed much earlier," the report said.
The committee also said that because the exact cause of the airbag inflator ruptures was still unknown, it was likely that replacement airbags being fitted in recalled cars would also eventually have to be recalled.
"Takata is currently producing hundreds of thousands of replacement inflators each month that may not completely eliminate the risk of airbag rupture," the report said.
But because the breakdown of propellant over time is thought to raise the risks of an airbag rupture, Takata and safety regulators agreed that the best course of action was to press on with the recalls, the report noted.
"It is best to continue replacing the old, defective inflaters as quickly as possible - even though there is a distinct possibility that some of these replacements will eventually also be recalled," the report said.
Along with Takata, the report harshly criticised the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Had the agency "promptly undertaken more aggressive steps to investigate the airbag ruptures, it is possible that this defect could have been addressed years earlier," the report said.
Two Honda recalls in 2008 and 2009 did prompt the agency to open an investigation into the two companies' handling of the defect. But it closed the inquiry after six months without requiring that Takata turn over all of the documents that had been requested. In closing the investigation, the agency wrote that there were no additional vehicles to be investigated and there was "insufficient information to suggest that Honda failed to make timely defect decisions on information it was provided." Less than a year later, after more airbags exploded in the field, Honda started to recall more cars.
The Senate committee recommended several legislative changes that would give the safety agency greater authority, like increasing its budget and allowing it to fine automakers up to $300 million for safety violations, rather than its current cap of $35 million. But the report also emphasised that the agency has the capability to make some significant changes on its own, without the help of Congress. In particular, the committee urged the safety agency to use its authority to expand the source of replacement parts and the number of authorised repair facilities to speed up fixes under the recall. It also implored the regulator to make its database of recalled cars at www.safercar.gov, in which consumers can search for unfixed defects by entering their vehicle identification numbers, easier to use and effective. A list of Takata-related recalls is also available.
Senator John Thune, a South Dakota Republican who is the chairman of the committee, has also been critical of the safety agency, particularly after the release of an internal audit by the Transportation Department's inspector general, Calvin L. Scovel III.
But Mr. Thune was sceptical of the need for more money at the agency.
"These issues cannot be solved just by throwing money at the department," he said.
©2015 The New York Times News Service
