President Hamid Karzai will be in India for a two-day visit, discussing issues that are of importance to both countries. This would be his twelfth visit here, and this in itself, is testimony to the importance of this relationship that both need to nurture constantly.
There are however concerns that affect both countries, arising from the impending drawdown, as it is called, of U.S. forces next year, the status of the Afghan security forces, the parlous state of the economy and the role and attitude of Pakistan, especially after the recent elections and the evolving Taliban insurgency as it prepares for a takeover after the U.S. withdrawal.
Details of how many and what kind of U.S. troops will leave and which kind will remain, but, it is generally accepted that the U.S. wants to retain nine bases with special forces meant for counter terror operations, training Afghan forces and protecting American forces in the country. The nine bases proposed are Baghram and Kandahar air bases, with the other bases are in Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Gardez, Shindad, Helmand and Herat.
Apart from this, it is the nature of the American presence that remains that would be important. As in Iraq, there has been an extensive privatisation of the war in Afghanistan, and, at one stage, there were 104,000 U.S. Department of Defence contractors and 68,000 U.S. troops amounting to 69 percent of the work force. So, the military cooks came from Kellogg Brown and Roots, while Military Professional Resources Inc provided logisticians and military advisers.
When the U.S. was spending USD 4 billion a month, there were lobsters and country steaks available for U.S. personnel once a week, but there were not enough winter jackets for Afghan soldiers, nor adequate training equipment for the instructors in the training schools. There were other problems relating to the culture and language divide between soldiers who could not speak Darri, distrust of, and at times, even contempt for, the Afghan soldier and a host of other similar problems compounded by the fact that the motive of the private contractors was profit not winning the peace.
An estimated 10 percent of the funds allocated reach their intended destination; the remainder being siphoned off by contractors and warlords. The often heard complaint that the Afghan National Security Forces are inadequate and ill-trained is not solely of Afghan making. The U.S. haste to raise an army that is also not perceived a threat to Pakistan is one of the major problems that President Karzai has to handle.
Afghanistan would need a viable security force which is adequately trained and equipped with firepower and mobility to handle a growing threat from a resurrected Taliban. This is what he is expected to seek from India.
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Karzai has other concerns too. Pakistan's involvement with the Taliban has evolved since the US surge in Afghanistan and as December 2014 approaches. A distinct trend is now discernible in east Afghanistan where some young Taliban who had escaped into Pakistan post 2001 were picked up and trained assiduously in paramilitary techniques, and sent to Punjab for higher training in English and IT. They are being taught how to work as undercover agents, equipped with Pakistani passports while their families are held as undeclared hostages.
They are no longer just the old style jihadi cannon fodder. They are then inducted into eastern Afghan provinces to be the links between the Taliban and Pakistan and also to keep a watch on US activities. The Taliban are evolving for the post 2014 phase and Pakistan hopes they will be under their control even then. The Taliban website Voice of Jihad regularly publishes news and monthly updates about Taliban victories and 'enemy' casualties which when read make for dismal reading.
Hamid Karzai is visiting India when his old collaborator in the Afghan jihad in 1980s, Nawaz Sharif, is preparing to become Pakistan's prime minister for the third time. During those happy days, Nawaz worked closely with Gen Zia and later as Prime Minister he had dashed to Kabul in April 1992 to instal a mujahedeen government in all its three phases. The Kargil episode notwithstanding, Nawaz Sharif, a Punjabi and a protege of the Army, has been close to them. The Generals have preferred Nawaz's politics to those of the 'dubious' PPP. Nawaz himself has been extensively involved both with the Taliban and the Northern Alliance in the past and had got the warring groups together in Islamabad in April-May 1998 to attempt an agreement.
It is, however, conceivable that nearly 30 years later, President Karzai may have some reservations about the attitudes of the prime minister-designate especially after the recent statements by Nawaz in the run up to the elections. Nawaz had said that Pakistan should stop supporting the international war on terror and talk to the terrorists instead. In the past too Nawaz had followed Zia's policies of Islamisation in his first term as Prime Minister and has shown a tendency to move in favour of the religious right when he had tried to introduce the sharia through a legislative enactment. There was a time when he wanted to be anointed Amir ul Momeen. Nawaz's closeness to Saudi Arabia, the other country that recognised the Taliban government in Kabul, is well known.
The fear in Kabul is that Pakistan may make peace with the Taliban and then concentrate on Afghanistan. Statements from the chief minister-designate in Khyber Pakhtunkha province that the Taliban were not their enemies only adds to these fears. With Imran Khan's pro-Taliban Tehrik Insaf in power in Peshawar and the Nawaz Muslim League in Lahore, Balochistan under Army control, Pakistan Generals probably see this as an opportunity to secure their interests in Afghanistan and also to have the Durand Line sanctified. The usual dual policy would apply, talk peace with the Taliban maybe through amenable persons like Imran Khan while destabilise Kabul through the new control on the Taliban.
This means strengthening the ANSF adequately that enables it to meet its primary threat which is tackling the Taliban insurgency. High on the list would be airlift capabilities including helicopters, air strike abilities and artillery pieces, one presumes. Imparting military training and equipment logistic supplies are also seen as urgent and abiding requirements. The Afghan Army has to be made fully functional so that it can clear and hold to enable economic development to take place.
While we congratulate ourselves that the US now wants to involve India in this venture, we need to be careful. India needs to assist in the furtherance of its own interests and not circumscribed by US caveats which usually seek to be over considerate to Pakistani interests.
The news coming from Pakistan is that Gen Kayani possibly advised caution to Nawaz Sharif on the peace initiative with India, the haste in Rawalpindi will be with regard to Afghanistan. For India, it is necessary to move in its own interests in the region and not convert hope for a better relationship with Pakistan as reason enough to give up its priorities in Afghanistan.
The geopolitical situation in our region could change with an energetic China looking for spaces to be vacated by the US. China's strong presence in Pakistan, growing interest in Afghanistan and closeness to Iran would lock India out of the region. In India's bilateral and larger regional interests, we need to help Afghanistan and supply funds and material.
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Attn: News Editors/News Desks: The views expressed in the above article are that of Mr. Vikram Sood, former Secretary R and AW, Government of India.
