New Delhi, Mar.31. (ANI) India has yet to completely get over its colonial hangover as far as the defence administration of the country is concerned. During the colonial period, the Commander- in- Chief, took decisions in consultation with his masters in London.
After Independence, Jawaharlal Nehru decided that decisions regarding the defence of the country would be taken by the Ministry of Defence in consultation with the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. The Commander -in- Chief, who later became the Chief of Army Staff, accepted directions from the Defence Minister. He had no authority over the Navy or the Air Force, which had their own Chiefs of Staff.
The Defence Minister had meetings with the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy and the Air Force to get advice on defence issues. The Chiefs of Staff had access to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, but it got tapered off after Krishna Menon became Defence Minister.
The Armed Forces of the country, however, were involved in maintaining the unity and integrity of the country ever since it became independent. The post partition violence and the refugee influx placed a heavy responsibility on the Army to maintain peace in Border States. Soon after, Jammu and Kashmir was invaded, and the State had to be protected against 'raiders' from Pakistan.
A major challenge that the country faced was the Chinese attack in 1962. Jawaharlal Nehru never thought China would attack, and the humiliating reverses during that war resulted in the withdrawal of the Indian Army from the North East Frontier Agency to the plains of Assam.
General K. S. Thimayya had cautioned the government in 1959 about China, but Jawaharlal Nehru was confident that the northern neighbour would never attack India.
Post-1962, the government took steps to strengthen defences along the northern border, but the basic structure of the defence ministry remained the same. The Defense Committee of the Cabinet was not revived after 1962. The role was taken over by the Cabinet Committee on Security which invited the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces on request. The situation continued to remain the same even after the India Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971.
Indira Gandhi, who was the Prime Minister in 1971, did have consultations with Army Chief, General (later Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw , following the crackdown by the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan and the influx of millions of refugees into the country. In the war that followed, India emerged victorious. Indira Gandhi made an effort to raise the level of the Chief of Army Staff to that of a Field Marshal, but it was resisted by the Air Force and the civilian bureaucracy.
The next shock that the country faced was the Kargil conflict, when the country had to face a nuclear-armed neighbour who had intruded across the Line of Control. The Armed Forces had to pay a heavy price to evict the intruders.
As General Deepak Kapoor , a former Chief of Army Staff, has pointed out in his article, post-Kargil conflict in 1999, the Government of India realised the overwhelming need for defence reforms . The Kargil Review Committee, set up after the Kargil conflict, noted that "India is perhaps the only major democracy where the armed forces headquarters are outside the apex governmental structure".
The committee recommended the creation of an integrated defence staff, an integrated command structure and the setting up of the office of a Chief of Defence Staff, who will be associated with decision making on defence matters at the highest level.
It has been over a decade, and the country is yet to see a Chief of Defence Staff. The new Defence Minister, Manohar Parikkar, has stated that he would soon appoint a Chief of Defence Staff. One has to wait and see when it will happen. The basic reason is that the Chiefs of Staff are reluctant to give up their "command" role, a colonial hangover, even though the British masters have changed their system long ago.
As Admiral (retired) Arun Prakash has pointed out in his piece, "while the military seethes with dissatisfaction at perceived imbalances, the political establishment and civilian bureaucracy are quite content with the way things are, and remain staunch upholders of status quo".
The book contains a detailed analysis by Vinod Misra on acquisition in defence, and a comprehensive article on the Defence Research and Development Organisation by the missile scientist Dr Sivathanu Pillai. Lt. Gen. (retired) Satish Nambiar, in his article on defence manpower, has projected the professionalism achieved by the Indian Armed Forces and given valuable recommendations.
Satya Narain Mishra in his article has pointed out that India's military industry complex, consists of nine Defence Public Secretor Undertakings, 40 Ordnance Factories, 50 DRDO laboratories, 140 private defence companies and 500 small and medium enterprises who are involved in production of around items.
The Defence Public Sector Under takings are engaged in the manufacture of a wide range of products like helicopters, fighters, warships, submarines, patrol vessels, heavy vehicles and earthmovers, missiles and a variety of electronic devices. The 40 Ordnance Factories are engaged in production of small arms and ammunition for all the weapons systems, clothing, besides armoured and transport vehicles.
However, the country is not self-reliant, and today India is one of the world's biggest importers of defence equipment. Many of the purchases have, periodically, been affected by allegations of corrupt practices. One remembers the scandal that broke out in the late 1980s in which Rs.64 crores were offered to Indian agencies in the purchase of Bofors guns. The scandal cost Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi his office. During the UPA government many defence purchases were put on hold by Defence Minister A. K. Antony and today the Armed Forces lack modern armament like aircraft and artillery.
The book contains a comprehensive article on how to strengthen India's defence and industrial base by Ravindra Gupta. The contributions by Satya Narain Misra and Laxman Kumar Behera provide suggestions on the Arms Trade Offset: Global Trend and 'Best Practices'. Vinod Misra in his contribution provides an oversight in defence and the need to ensure operational preparedness of the Armed Forces. Kanwal Sibal, a former Foreign Secretary, has given a comprehensive piece on India's security environment and its impact on India's defence which gives "the country no choice but to build up a robust defence capability with self-reliance as our goal".
As claimed, the book seeks to put together perceptions, views and recommendations of a host of practitioners at the highest level from the civil and military bureaucracy who have had some unmatched insights into the complex world of Indian Defence and its decision making structures and process. It deserves to be on the table of every bureaucrat, civil or military.
Book Review: Core concern in Indian Defence and the Imperatives for Reforms; edited by Vinod Misra; Pentagon Press; pages 374. Price Rs 1095.
I.Ramamohan Rao is a former Principal Information Officer of the Government of India. He can be reached on his e-mail:raoramamohan@hotmail.
