The two-day "Ijtida" organized by Jamaat-Ud-Dawa in Lahore last week, free license given to Hafiz Saeed and his supporters by the Pakistani establishment and the rabid anti-Indian statements with Islamic overtones made during the "Ijtida" has once again focused attention towards role of Pakistan in promoting Islamic militancy in the region.
But why should Islamic militancy be promoted in Pakistan by the Pakistani establishment when they are also suffering on account of the activities of such militants?
There are two distinct narratives about the problem of Islamic militancy in Pakistan. The Pakistan Government, the army establishment and a substantial section of Pakistani academics argue that Pakistan is a major victim of Islamic terrorism. They point to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the thousands of deaths suffered by the Pakistanis - by both civilian and security forces that are undeniably true, if little exaggerated.
The other narrative which is accepted widely not only in India, but also internationally, is that Pakistan has been a major contributor to the growth of Islamic militancy - not only in the South Asian region, but also, in other parts of the world.
There are quite a few academics that support this view even within Pakistan, but their voices are not surprisingly muted. So, where does the truth lie? In the West "Islamic fundamentalism" became "Islamic militant terror" only post 2001.
As is well known, the U.S. and the Western powers did utilize the Islamic militancy for uprooting the Soviets from Afghanistan and were willing and active partners of General Zia and the Saudis in promoting Islamic militancy in Afghanistan.
India felt the effects of Islamic militancy earlier particularly in Kashmir where Pakistan have been trying to utilize it to suit their geo-political interests.
Islamic militancy in Pakistan is linked with the issue of Islamism in Pakistani polity and any study of Islamic militancy in Pakistani has to be understood as a part of the growth of Islamism in the country rather than in its isolation.
To understand the role of Islamism in Pakistan, one has to begin in the beginning - that is the partition of India. Pakistan was created as a state to protect the interests of the Muslims of India but interestingly the demand came not from Islamic parties or from those states where Muslims were in majority. The clamour for Pakistan was led by Muslim "liberals" led by Jinnah, and it was led by leaders from regions where Muslims were a minority.
The demand for Pakistan was thus initially nothing but a negotiating strategy pursued by the leaders of Muslim League to get maximum power for themselves.
It was only later, after the forces unleashed by this demand of the Muslim League and the inflexible attitude of the Indian National Congress, that Pakistan was seriously considered as an option by them.
The Hindu-Muslim animosity and subsequent communal carnage engendered by these developments prepared the ground for the later rise of Islamism in Pakistan.
For Jinnah, Islam was a tool to be used to further the interests of the Muslim League, and once having achieved Pakistan as a nation, Islamism was not his agenda.
However, he had unleashed the forces that he was unable to control in the short life that he had after the creation of Pakistan.
If Jinnah and Liaqat used Islam as a tool to further their aims, it was foolhardy to expect that the same tool would not be used by others to further their aims.
Indeed, the leaders in newly formed Pakistan tried to be more and more radical. There was a clamour to change the script of Bengali from its Sanskrit base to Arabic, and even to introduce Arabic as the national language. Since Islam was the reason for creation of Pakistan, it followed that Islamism was the credo of the new state. It was a small step from there to growth of Islamic militancy later.
Within Pakistani society, gradually two distinct fault lines developed. The first was between Islamists and the secularists. This fault line emerged right in the beginning of Pakistan's life. As mentioned earlier, for Jinnah, Islamism was a tool to attain an objective and once that objective was achieved, Pakistan was to become like any other secular and liberal state. However for the Islamic parties, reverse was true. They felt that having achieved Pakistan in the name of Islam, Islamism was an obvious choice by which to govern the state. They also perceived themselves as leaders of Islamic world.
The second fault line that soon developed in Pakistan was between the army and the civilians. Unlike in India, where democracy took strong root thanks to the towering personality of Nehru, in Pakistan, the first decade after independence saw a succession of weak leaders once Jinnah and Liaqat passed away, prompting the military to take over power.
Since the time Ayub Khan took power in Pakistan, the military's role has been paramount. The civilian leaderships that grew did try to challenge the military's role, but their successes have always been short lived.
To defeat the growing popularity of civilian leadership, the military utilized the Islamist forces in the country. The Islamists found that whereas they had a loyal committed following in the country, when it came to getting power democratically, they inevitably fell short.
The only way for them to get power was to get on the military's bandwagon, and that they did with great alacrity.
In return, the military got support of a section of people who could be manipulated and who had great street power even if it was not enough for them to get a democratic mandate.
Since Islam was the raison d' etre of Pakistan, the military and mullahs found common enemies in India and in the popularly-elected civilian leadership.
Thus, whenever a civilian political leader became too strong, Islamic groups were propped up by the military to create public disenchantment and take over power.
The Islamists were usually the first to support the military takeover in the name of the interest of country and religion. Whether it was Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif, in each case the same drama unfolded with minor variation in themes.
The civilian leadership also fell in the trap. They tried to win over the Islamists to their side by at times being more Islam centric than the military.
Thus, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto came up with the idea of an Islamic bomb and tried to introduce laws to please the Islamists, even though he professed to be a leftist.
Nawaz Sharif, who was initially the creation of the military, tried later to get out of their clutches. For this purpose, he befriended Islamic groups. His support to Kashmir-centric jehadi groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) are in his view nothing but a political necessity.
Recently, it is Imran Khan who is professing support to causes of militant Islamic parties. Thus, we find more and more support to Islamic parties.
To begin with, this support was to established Islamic political parties such as JI or JUI.
In course of time, shadowy Islamist groups such as the Afghan Taliban, LET, LeJ and Sipah-e-Sahaba got support - sometimes overt, more often covert.
Both the military and the civilian leadership played the game with gusto. However, both in Pakistan miscalculated and made the mistake of thinking that they could manipulate the Islamist groups.
Sometimes, they were successful in achieving their short term objectives, but as a result, the Islamic forces and ideology got a tremendous boost.
As it inevitably happens in such cases, the creatures soon become equally if not more powerful as their creators.
Slowly, the Islamists started to flex their muscles even against the army. When Musharraf had to take a U turn in Pakistan's Afghan policy as a result of American pressure, a majority of the Islamists rebelled.
The army found that the tool they had created to control political opponents domestically, and India and Afghanistan externally, had become too powerful, and were no longer fully under their control.
Thus, the TTP was born in 2007 with the avowed purpose of establishing Islamic rule in Pakistan, and if the Army was not in sync with them in this objective, they were prepared to take on the army.
Even before 2007, groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba had turned against the government.
The military establishment tried to overcome this problem by making a distinction between "Good" Islamists and "Bad" Islamists.
Thus, groups such as LeT, Afghan Taliban and Jaish-e-Mohammad are considered "good" militant Islamists, while others such as the TTP, LeJ or Sipah-e-Sahaba are considered "bad" militants.
However, an important point which is missed in this distinction is that militant Islamism is an ideology and even if the leaders of parties such as LeT or JeM are under control of their masters, the rank and file is not.
When it comes to their relationship with fellow militants among "bad" groups, the rank and file is ideologically driven to defend them.
This distinction between the "good militant" and "bad militant" is thus only a fiction. The common Pakistani is suffering on account of this distinction since it is not possible to eradicate TTP without also simultaneously taking action against groups such as LeT.
That is the bane of Pakistani polity. It is true that Pakistan is suffering immensely on account of terrorism, but the chink in the Pakistani establishment narrative is that unless they stop making a distinction between good militant and bad militant, depending upon when it suits their interest, the problem is not only going to persist, it is going to increase. Unless the Pakistani establishment realizes this basic fact, the Islamic militancy is there to stay in the region.
Attn: The article represents the views of Mr. Rajiv Kumar, who retired as Additional Secretary in Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India. Mr. Kumar has experience of dealing with security and intelligence-related matters for nearly thirty years. By Rajiv Kumar
.
