The bitter truth is that encouraged by Pakistan's strategists, huge militant establishments are holding the Pakistan state hostage by running their own training centres, hospitals, and disaster relief programmes, and are flush with both funds and weapons.
Incumbent Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif desperately wants to retain his position as there is an ambitious upstart waiting in the wings. The 2014 standoff between the two has left the military stronger.
The Peshawar carnage has led to the establishment of military courts: something that is abominable to many in Pakistan. This makes the army much more powerful. Besides, the idea of military men presiding over courts is against democracy.
The proscription of the Haqqani Network and the JuD (LeT) has been received with a great degree of scepticism in Pakistan. These two organizations are far too powerful and the Pakistan state far too dependent on them for their policies in Afghanistan and India. They are like being special commandoes in a guerrilla force - totally loyal and effective. Only the US spokesperson believed this news which many see as being timed for the Obama visit to India. It will be business as usual after he leaves.
During Operation Zarb-e-Azb last year, Haqqani Network cadres were relocated to the adjoining Kurram and Orakzai agencies, and not a single network leader was captured or killed. All that they do is to lie low for some time and then surface once the winter snows melt. As far as India is concerned, the situation is similar.
While in London recently, General Raheel Sharif spoke at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He made it quite clear that Kashmir is at the centre of his concerns with India. During the tenure of his predecessor, General Ashfaq Kayani, the LoC was largely silent, but the way the LoC has lit up since General Sharif's assumption of office, is a pointer to the future.
India and Kashmir-specific jihadists like Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar have become increasingly vocal and visible over several months. If that is so, why would Pakistan want to demobilize these jihadists anytime soon? Madrassa reforms and limitations are meaningless if the demand for jihadism continues to grow.
Hafiz Saeed is the army's poster boy, often seen on TV shows, at mosques or in stadiums, delivering sermons about Ghazwa-e-Hind or whatever takes his fancy. They cannot afford to lose him, even for a day. So, with the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi focusing on the Shia community and occasional forays into Balochistan that serves a dual purpose, the Lashkar-e-Taiba concentrating on Kashmir and the Afghan Taliban network eyeing Afghanistan, all talk of a unified stance against terrorism seems and will remain only that: talk, as all three serve different security interests.
The sheer brutality of the December 16, 2014 Peshawar massacre should have been Pakistan's 9/11 or 26/11 moment. It hasn't, really. The contrast to the way the French reacted to the Charlie Hebdo killing is one aspect. The other is the way many of the Pakistani extremists reacted. There is now an open debate in the West among Muslim scholars about blasphemy and what constitutes offence and offence in Islam. Pakistan will also have to seriously debate this, because if unchecked, this and other facets could transform Pakistan from a Muslim state to an Islamist one.
This article is the fourth of a four-part series written by Mr. Ghulam Ahmed. The views expressed in the article are that of the author.
