This year Jammu and Kashmir has been in the news for more negative reasons than positive. There has been a significant increase in the number of incursions by the Pakistan-backed militants across the Line of Control and the international border, and, there has been a serious attempt to disturb communal peace at Kishtwar in the month of August which was the scene of an attempt at 'ethnic cleansing' in the nineties.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh chose to meet the newly elected third time Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif in spite of the incidents along the border in the Jammu region when terrorists backed by the Pakistan Army chose to attack a police station and an army unit. Soon after the meeting at the Prime Ministerial- level, there were attempts by militants to cross the Line of Control in the Keran Sector.
The conclusion: Pakistan, particularly the Inter Services Intelligence of the country, has not given up attempts to promote violence and militancy in Jammu and Kashmir and indulge in ethnic cleansing by forcing the Dogras to migrate from the Kishtwar region on the same lines the Kashmiri Pandits were forced to migrate from the valley.
The cease fire that had come into effect in 2003 and was largely observed in Jammu and Kashmir is under strain and it is time the Government of India changed its strategy.
India has many lessons to learn from its experience in 1998, when there was an attempt to cleanse the Kishtwar region of Hindu Dogras who form 39.3 percent of the population. To stop the migration of minorities, the State Government encouraged the formation of Village Defence Committees which were provided with arms. Even though they were only World War I vintage Lee Enfield rifles, they helped the Committees to keep the attackers at bay till the army came in. The strategy proved effective.
Troops of the Rashtriya Rifles deployed in the area had the dual task of keeping the Jammu Srinagar Highway open as also counter the militants in the area. The situation came to a head when 25 Dogras were massacred in Chepnari on 19th June 1998, 23 Dogras were killed in Kalaban in Chamba ib 19 July 1998 and 16 Dogras were killed in Horna of Kishtwar on 27th July 1998.
The situation became further tense, when, following the Kargil conflict, troops had to be moved to the front. The situation worsened and between August 2000 and November 2000, 38 Dogras were killed in the Kishtwar region. It was during this sensitive period that the author was posted as sector commander of the Kishtwar region.
The estimate was that between 1993 and 2001, a total of 229 Dogras were systematically massacred in Kishtwar.
The Indian Army then decided to have an offensive mindset. The author, as sector commander of the Kishtwar region, was able to register many successes while going on the offensive against the militants, including foreign jehadis in the region.
The author points out that when the first group of foreign terrorists came into the region, they were a great novelty. With their Karakul caps, long hair and cavemen beards - they gave the charismatic Che Guevara look. The local girls were swept off their feet by these Guest Mujahideen. There were a number of marriages of local girls with these 'guest warriors'.
But to their shock and horror, these girls and their parents realized that the Guest Mujahideen were there for two to three year tenure at best. They vanished into the mountains, never to return.
The situation changed soon. When the Guest Mujahideen were not finding local women to get married, the foreigners started poaching on married women, which meant that the husbands had to stand outside their houses while a group of terrorists slaked their lust on their women within. This naturally became too much to take and soon intelligence began to flow in.
The author points out that the Mujahideen justified rape and use of Kashmiri girls as comfort women. "Do your duty by the Jihad. We have come to free you from the infidels. It is your duty to comfort the warriors"
General Bakshi has given interesting stories of the many operations conducted by his formation. He has also narrated the steps taken by the formation to win the hearts and minds of the people of the area.
Putting things in perspective , the author has pointed out that the campaign in Jammu and Kashmir can be divided into three clear phases: 1) the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) phase from 1990 -96. 2) The Jihad phase spearheaded initially by the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) the Lashkar-e-Toiba(LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) from 1997 to 2003 and 3) The post LC Fence phase from 2003 onwards to the present - when infiltration was drastically curtailed by a physical and electronic barrier on the Line of Control.
The useful publication was released by Lt. Gen. (Retired) S. K. Sinha, who was associated with the developments in the State from 1947 when Indian Army troops first landed there. General Sinha had served in various capacities in the Army headquarters and headed the State as Governor till 2008. His address, while releasing the book, pointed out the many mistakes committed by the Indian establishment in the State.
In the final analysis, we have seen that as far as Pakistan is concerned the 'Dialogue' and 'Back channel negotiations' have not helped. We have to take a position that would deter those who seek to destabilize the state and the country The Line of Control and the 'Kishtwar Cauldron' are unlikely to cool down.. Neither will Kashmir be allowed to live in peace by Pakistan.
Book Review: Kishtwar Cauldron, By Maj Gen(Dr) G. D. Bakshi. Pages 190. Pentagon Press.
The above article has been authored by Mr. I. Ramamohan Rao, Former Principal Information Officer of the Government of India and now Chief Editor, ANI (ANI)
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