LIBERATION: BANGLADESH 1971
First Hand, Untold Action Stories from The War Zone
Edited by Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch & Lt Col Quazi Sajjad Ali Zahir
Bloomsbury; 299 pages; Rs 499
Combatants caught in the fog of war may often be unaware of the larger context. That perspective is usually provided by historians, with the luxury of hindsight, and the liberty to dilate and compress time frames and emphasise what they choose.
But the search for a broader perspective often overshadows the subaltern. How do individuals behave in the heat and confusion of battle? How do they respond when bullets are flying and civilians are being bayoneted and raped?
Although countless books have been written about the birth of Bangladesh, this is perhaps the first to collect just anecdotal accounts from individuals, Indians and Bangladeshis, who were participants in the seminal events of 1971. Liberation makes no attempt at pulling back to offer perspective in telling or retelling those stories.
On December 3, 1971, after months of skirmishes and guerrilla actions, India launched a multi-pronged invasion of East Pakistan. On December 16, the Pakistani commander, lieutenant general Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi, surrendered and 90,000 Pakistani defence personnel became prisoners of war (PoWs).
The bulk of the accounts in Liberation are drawn from that fortnight of conventional war. There are different individual perspectives (Indian, Bangladeshi, officers, other ranks) describing the same actions. The campaign featured some very unusual operations.
When IV Army Corps charged into northeastern Bangladesh, out of Meghalaya and Tripura, it set new trends in helicopter-borne operations, including crossing the 40-km wide Meghna River. Another such action was the Tangail airdrop, which was the most massive paratrooper assault since World War II.
Both Tangail and the heli-bridges were risky gambits. Both were spectacularly successful. Indeed the paratroops were the first troops to reach Dhaka, using a new road unmarked on maps. Officers went undercover into Tangail to pick drop sites and ensure coordination with local guerrillas led by "Bagha" Kader Siddiqui.
Brigadier Prashant Ghosh's memories are entertainingly presented (and corroborated in an account by Nuran Nabi of the Tangail Mukti Bahini). Mr Ghosh was captain "Peter", dressed in a "uniform" of torn banian and lungi. He presented Mr Siddiqui with a tube of Indian Odomos (a well-known brand of mosquito repellent) to establish his credentials (his accent confirmed he was West Bengali anyhow!) Captain Ghosh helped blow up bridges, marked drop sites and "requisitioned" transport for the paras. His one regret is that he failed to "liberate" the flag on Niazi's staff-car - a naval officer snaffled it first.
The craziest story from Tangail is that of Mahadev Gurao. Havildar Gurao's parachute malfunctioned and left him dangling upside down a few feet below the aircraft (a Fairchild Packet). The aircrew managed to free him after he had swung underneath the flying aircraft for 22 minutes. Gurao finally floated down on a reserve parachute, 80 km from his drop zone. He landed in a village pond and was promptly inducted into the Mukti Bahini and spent the next few days raiding Pakistani outposts. After the surrender, he rejoined his brigade, which had, of course, written him off as missing in action.
The Meghna crossings and earlier operations in Sylhet involved using small helicopter forces aggressively and innovatively. Unlike Tangail, which had been war-gamed and planned meticulously, the heli-borne assaults were inspired examples of opportunism by lieutenant general Sagat Singh.
Those actions involved flying troops straight into battle, often in the teeth of heavy fire. The choppers took major punishment. The logistics were formidable and stretched the air units well beyond their design limits.
In the Meghna crossing, 11 MI4 choppers with a design capacity for company-level support (lifting 125-150 armed men at 14 troopers a chopper) airlifted over 6,000 troops (carrying 23 a chopper) and their equipment, flying continuous sorties over the river. Incidentally, these actions involved the "Bangladesh Air Force", which consisted of a few Bangladeshi pilots flying Indian aircraft.
Pakistani garrisons were bypassed and surrounded, and attempts to break out were repulsed with heavy casualties. The Battle of Jamalpur saw "sledging". Brigadier Hardev Kler offered surrender terms to the garrison commander, lieutenant colonel Sultan Ahmed, who responded with a defiant note, wrapped around a bullet. Brigadier Kler had the last laugh when he caught lieutenant colonel Ahmed's forces in an ambush as the Pakistanis tried to break out.
However, the most poignant section focuses on the months of resistance (March-November 1971). The Mukti Bahini was trained and armed by India. But it was spawned by the brutality of the Pakistani crackdown. Some 10 million East Bengalis became refugees. Anywhere up to three million were killed. There were multiple massacres, mass rapes and abduction of women.
In response, ordinary men and women picked up guns. Accounts of their heroism and martyrdom may seem over-blown. But the courage of these civilians and the exact intelligence they procured ensured success for the military campaign.
These vignettes from the fog of war don't offer much in the way of lessons. But it may be noted that the Indian army won international plaudits in 1971 for its impeccable treatment of civilians and PoWs. Contrast that with all the latter-day accusations of outrages committed by Indian troops conducting internal security operations. Perhaps there is cause for introspection there.
