India has long been an outlier among well-armed liberal democracies in not having an integrated command for its military, with a single member of the uniformed services serving at the apex of the forces, and as the primary form of contact with military points of view for the civilian defence establishment. There are essentially two models, both of which evolved from the many joint operations that had to be conducted by Allied forces in World War II. The United States has a committee called the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or JCS. Its chairman, the US' highest-ranked military man, has no operational or command role, but he serves as a crucial military advisor to the US president. The Commonwealth countries and France have a Chief of Defence Staff, or CDS, in which largely the seniormost officer of the armed forces has operational authority.
As this newspaper has reported, India is finally likely to introduce a similar system. The soon-to-retire army chief, General Bikram Singh, may be appointed the first permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) next month. First indications are that the new chairman of the COSC is not likely to be awarded an additional star of seniority over the four-star service chiefs. This might indicate that the original recommendation, made after the Kargil war by a group of ministers in 2001 of a CDS on the Commonwealth model, is not being followed explicitly. However, it remains to be seen to what degree this role is purely advisory.
Either way, it is a very important step forward. For one, it brings a uniformed officer with no direct operational role into the highest strategic councils of the land. For another, it is a crucial assist for the cause of "jointness", or multi-service planning and operation, in India. Jointness has suffered, thanks to the mutual suspicion of the three armed services and the unwillingness of civilian leaders to lay down a firm line to them. The Indian navy has probably been the most willing to accept joint command, while the army and particularly the air force have both cavilled at various points.
Various important points, however, remain to be worked out. As the position of chairman of the JCS in the US demonstrates, even a post with no operational control can wield great power. However, that would require, first, an organisation that the chairman of the COSC could control. And it would require the civilians in the defence ministry to accept a uniformed officer as their equal, rather than a de facto subordinate. Both these must happen, because it is vital that the new chairman of the COSC occupy more than a ceremonial post. It has often been remarked that India lacks a coherent grand strategy in military matters. Further, the presence of joint strike forces who might be called on to do more fighting in the future will require direct attention to the requirements of "jointness" at the highest, strategic levels. For all these reasons, if a decision has finally been taken on creating a chairman of the COSC, it is a good thing. Perhaps a five-star position and actual executive command for the COSC itself would have been better; but, either way, this should be followed up with the creation of a support structure for the new post.
