The naming of Rex Tillerson, chairman and chief executive officer of oil company ExxonMobil, as the next Secretary of State of the United States has deepened speculation about the direction that country’s foreign policy will take under Donald Trump. This is a difficult exercise, not least because Mr Trump’s own heated tweets can serve to derail any attempt at analysis. Most recently, for example, Mr Trump suggested that the People’s Republic of China could keep a US undersea drone that its navy had taken from international waters in the South China Sea. Yet there is nevertheless enough evidence in the public domain — not least, the choice of Mr Tillerson — to begin the process of painting a coherent picture of Mr Trump’s expectations from US diplomacy.
The need for the US to “make deals” was a running theme in Mr Trump’s campaign. He repeatedly made the case that the US had not been served well by successive administrations that had come to international agreements that undercut, in Mr Trump’s opinion, its interests. This concern extended beyond trade agreements, which the President-elect repeatedly attacked on the stump. He also mentioned the deal to end Iran’s nuclear programme, and even the US’ negotiations with long-time military allies such as Japan. Indeed, various readings of Mr Trump’s pronouncements on foreign policy even before he began this run for President two years ago have noted that poor “deal-making” has been central to his critique of US diplomacy. His choice of Mr Tillerson has thus been seen in this context, because the oil man is believed to be able to strike a deal even with the toughest world leaders.
But what will a world in which the US government announces that everything is up for renegotiation look like? It is likely to be one, as various concerned observers have pointed out, in which long-standing US allies and long-promoted principles will no longer be sacrosanct. The promotion of open markets and democracy has been, however flawed, imperfect and hypocritical, the mainstay of post-war US engagement with the world. It was explicitly and implicitly assumed that a world with more trade and more democracy was one in which the US would do better. Mr Trump does not, fundamentally, agree with that assumption. He sees the world as some businessmen do, real-estate businessmen in particular: Every relationship must be transactional, it must pay for itself. Military allies must justify their worth, and take primary responsibility for their security. Trade deals and economic issues will not be insulated from larger geo-strategic requirements but be exalted above them. Aspects of this attitude have been seen before, particularly in the post-9/11 period in which all countries were judged in Washington by their willingness to bend before the US’ counter-terrorism agenda. Mr Trump has just revived and extended that thinking.
For India, this is not necessarily good news. For one, the lack of a coherent values-driven approach is likely to exacerbate uncertainty, especially geopolitical instability, across the world. Secondly, this might dent India’s relationship with the US, which was hitherto based on a shared worldview. New Delhi, which has long feared transactional thinking in the Indo-US relationship, may well have to adjust its expectations from Washington now.
