The first non-Congress government in India after Independence was formed in 1977. Technically, it was single-party rule with the Janata Party at the helm. But the Janata Party was actually a coalition of many parties that had decided to merge themselves under one umbrella with the single-point agenda of defeating the Congress. That goal it achieved without doubt — but staying together as a single party afterwards became difficult for obvious reasons.
Less than two years after its formation, the Janata Party government fell, giving rise to a new government headed by Charan Singh’s Janata Party (Secular), with outside support from the Congress, then led by Indira Gandhi. That government also fell in a few months, with the Congress withdrawing support even before Charan Singh could actually secure a vote of confidence in Parliament.
One of the lessons the Indian electorate drew from that politically messy period was that the Congress was better qualified to run a stable government. So, the Congress under Indira Gandhi was returned to power to lead the government in 1980. Indira Gandhi’s assassination in 1984 helped the Congress earn a sympathy wave riding on which Rajiv Gandhi led the party to another victory at the polls.
It was a comment on the people’s disappointment with Rajiv Gandhi and V P Singh’s rising popularity that the Congress lost the elections in 1989 and a non-Congress government was formed at the Centre once again. Rajiv Gandhi had held out so much hope, but he failed to honour many of his promises. In sharp contrast, V P Singh was able to exploit popular sentiment surrounding charges of corruption against the Congress government, including its prime minister.
The National Front government, led by V P Singh, was also a sort of coalition of like-minded parties. But, like the Janata Party government, it too could not last more than a year — giving way to a new government by November 1990, headed by Chandra Shekhar with outside support from the Congress, then led by Rajiv Gandhi. It was almost like 1977 revisited, the only difference being that while Charan Singh resigned before even facing Parliament, Chandra Shekhar enjoyed that privilege.
There was yet another attempt at forming a coalition government at the Centre by a non-Congress group. This was in 1996, after a five-year term for a Congress government led by P V Narasimha Rao from 1991 to 1996. The Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP, formed a minority government in May 1996, but failed to muster enough support to get Parliament’s vote of confidence and resigned after 13 days. A new non-Congress coalition government was formed with H D Deve Gowda as prime minister. This was the United Front government — and this one too collapsed in less than a year, giving way to the formation of a new government led by I K Gujral, which again did not last longer than a year. The Congress was responsible for the fall of both.
The reason we are delving into India’s history of governments in the past 35 years is to underline the fact that the Indian electorate’s current disenchantment with the kind of problems a coalition government at the Centre faces is nothing new. The problems in 1977-79, 1989-91 and 1996-98 pertained to the failure of a non-Congress party to lead a successful coalition government. In each case, it was the Congress that pulled the rug from under the feet of the government at the Centre. And the Congress could do that mainly because it was not part of the alliance or the coalition, which was not strong enough to remain in power on its own. Thus, the Congress’ support to the government from outside became crucial.
Those who are complaining today about the perils of coalition governments perhaps do not realise that Indian politics has moved on in the last three decades — from the uncertainties of running a coalition government with outside support, to forming an alliance with its own majority, so that the nature of the relationship has now become different. So, if the Left gave trouble to UPA-I, and Mamata Banerjee forced the government to go slow on reforms (even Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s alliance government faced unusual demands from its coalition partners), the Indian electorate is only witnessing a different version of the power to blackmail — one far less dangerous and risky from the stability point of view. No doubt, though, even this is disturbing and needs to change.
It is a pity that major political parties are not focusing on this need to change and introduce safeguards to make coalition governments more stable and less susceptible to the kind of pressures that UPA-II has been subjected to in the last few months. Coalitions continue to be formed without any common minimum programmes that cover all contentious policy issues in all spheres of governance. If coalition governments are here to stay, then political parties too ought to recognise the importance of pre-poll agreements on major policy issues. And once an agreement is in place, it is important that all the coalition partners honour the agreement — in letter and in spirit. Without that, the Indian electorate is likely to become disillusioned with the kind of coalition politics drama it is now witnessing.
