A K Bhattacharya: The lucky five

RAISINA HILL

Why should the government single out only five secretary-level positions by granting them a two-year minimum tenure?

At present, there are 96 secretary-level positions in different departments in the Union government. Of these, only seven positions were vacant as at the beginning of October. That's good going!

In addition to the secretaries to the Union government, there are 83 more slots that accommodate officers of a rank equivalent to a secretary or a special secretary (who incidentally enjoy the same financial perquisites as those of a secretary). Even here the government's record in filling up the slots is not bad. At present, there are only 19 vacancies.

But this piece is not about how prompt the government has been in filling up the secretary-level vacancies in civil service. It is about a question that is bothering many civil servants right now. Why should the government single out only five out of these 96 secretary-level positions for a special favour by granting them a two-year minimum tenure? The lucky positions are those of the defence secretary, home secretary and the chiefs of the Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). The Cabinet secretary's position had already been assured of a two-year tenure, thanks to a decision taken by the Vajpayee government.

At the time these decisions were announced in September, the government's rationale was that these jobs were operational and not policy-oriented. Hence, the government wanted a minimum tenure of two years for them. The line that divides an operational responsibility and policy formulation responsibility of a secretary-level officer in any department is indeed very thin. How much of the finance secretary's job is operational and how much is devoted to the formulation of policies is difficult to decide. Many officials argue that for most secretary-level officials, their responsibilities are an amalgam of both operational and policy-related responsibilities. In any case, it is difficult to argue that a home secretary's responsibilities are all operational and nothing that he does pertains to policy formulation, or vice versa.

What has also irked the bureaucrats is that by offering only a fixed tenure for only five such bureaucrats out of 96 secretaries, the government has made a mockery of what Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced at a conference of district collectors. Singh, known for his keen interest in beefing up the civil service, had suggested a mechanism by which all administrative jobs had a minimum fixed tenure to give the officers an opportunity to work to a plan, deliver results and act without fear of any sudden transfer effected by politicians. This was welcomed by all civil servants. But the Cabinet decision that followed just four months later has confounded them.

Worse, a special rule is now inserted in the guidelines for enforcing the Right to Information Act that does not compel the government to reveal the notes of a civil servant on a file concerning public policy. In other words, if a citizen wants to know what stand a bureaucrat took on a policy issue, for instance, on providing counter-guarantee to the Dabhol power project, the government is within its rights to black out the notes of bureaucrats on such issues on the relevant files and then make them available.

This, many civil servants feel, can shield the corrupt or pliant officials against public scrutiny guaranteed under the Right to Information Act. It has been argued that bureaucrats may not freely write their comments on policy files if they know their views on an issue can become public. But why should a bureaucrat at all be apprehensive of what his views are on a certain project or a policy? In fact, the fear that a bureaucrat's notes on the file on a policy or a project can become public will ensure that ministers or even bureaucrats take the right decision in the larger public interest. It is clear that the prime minister has been influenced by those ministers who want to use or misuse bureaucrats to achieve their own goals.

The irony is that while the prime minister has been making the right noises about reforming the civil service with minimum fixed tenures for civil servants, greater autonomy with accountability and a better system for appraising bureaucrats, the government has been sitting on several well-intentioned recommendations made by at least two committees to restructure bureaucracy. But there is nobody who is as keen on following them with an action plan.

The reports of committees, headed by Surendra Nath and PC Hota (both former bureaucrats) seem to be gathering dust in government cupboards. There is a lot of merit in many of their suggestions on performance appraisal, creation of cadres based on domain knowledge, phasing out mediocre officers after 15 or 20 years in service and a bar on bureaucrats taking up jobs in the private sector within two years of superannuation or separation. But then who cares about civil service reforms?