Barack Obama has done a neat about-turn of US policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, or Af-Pak as it is now termed. From seeking military victory, Washington has moved to a search for deals with the “good Taliban” that it has suddenly discovered exist—and this suggests the beginnings of an exit strategy. From going it virtually alone, the US now wants to make a common effort by roping in all the powers of the region, from Russia and China to India and even Iran, plus the Gulf Arab states. The focus has shifted too, from Afghanistan to Pakistan (which, India has long maintained, is the root of the problem); the US now wants to look at saving Pakistan from teetering over the edge—hence a large aid package. The fourth shift in policy is to call Pakistan’s long-playing game of bluff, to try and stop Islamabad from hunting with the American hare and running with the Afghan hound. There could soon be a fifth policy shift, to dump Afghan President Hamid Karzai and to look for a suitable replacement.
Some elements of the new policy thrust should be welcomed in New Delhi, because it puts Pakistan on the spot when it comes to its support to the Taliban and other jihadi elements, because Iranian engagement will offer the US an alternative route into Afghanistan, and because a broad-based dialogue among all the powers with an interest in the region can only help matters. However, there are worry points too, principally because New Delhi does not believe there is anything like a “good Taliban”. There will also be misgivings about a repetition of the long history of American aid to Pakistan (diversion to serve nuclear and military objectives against India). Still, since the US is essentially fighting a battle that is in India’s interest, hence the new policy thrust must be welcomed for what it offers.
The problem is that Pakistan too will sense that Mr Obama is positioning the US for a medium-term exit. If Islamabad is convinced that the US is not going to stay the course, the Pak army will reckon that all it has to do is wait it out for about three years, by when the next US presidential campaign will be under way. In the interim, Pakistan’s generals could even be expected to stir up trouble on the Indian border or along the Line of Control, when they need an excuse for not meeting whatever goals Mr Obama sets them in the “war on terror”. That will also serve Pakistan’s continuing effort to bring the focus back on Kashmir. In the long run, India will be left to deal with an even more problematic Pakistan, and it had better get prepared for all eventualities—including one possible fall-out of the virtual obliteration of the Durand Line: a de facto new state of Pakhtoonistan, controlled by Islamabad and therefore a negative development from India’s perspective.
The only way to avoid getting sucked into a regional Pak-Af quagmire would be to build the country’s security bulwarks, increase its network of international engagements and break way from being bracketed with the dysfunctional states in its neighbourhood. From that standpoint, it is important that Manmohan Singh and Mr Obama start on a good note when they meet later this week, on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Britain. The initial soundings on this from Washington are said to be good, so there is reason for hope.
