It has been a week since the attack on the Indian Air Force base in Pathankot was finally brought to an end. By now, a process of examination of what went wrong should have begun. It has been reported that Prime Minister Narendra Modi has expressed his concern over the lax security at the Pathankot airbase. After all, the attack took place even though prior warning was received, and seven service men were killed as a result. But, it is also true that some others in the government have declared that the counter-terror operation was successful because the air planes in the secure area of the Pathankot base were not destroyed. That is, however, far too low a bar for success. Certainly, given the strategic implications of India's border installations, more is expected.
There are two questions that should form the backbone of any examination of the Pathankot operation. First, was the institutional process for dealing with such an event ignored, or was it inadequate? Second, what is the nature of individual responsibility for the decisions taken during the operation, and will there be accountability for those decisions? Both these questions must be answered satisfactorily. After all, the stability of the prime minister's courageous opening up to the Pakistani civilian establishment depends upon minimising the threat that anti-peace factions in Pakistan pose to Indian interests. Surely, when Mr Modi went to Lahore on Christmas Day, the government knew that some form of attack might well follow. Given that, it is not yet clear if the institutions that exist to deal with such an attack had swung smoothly into operation when intelligence about an impending attack on Pathankot was received. Forget about the Cabinet Committee on Security, it is reportedly the case that a Crisis Management Group - a body which would include the relevant senior Union government officials - did not meet. Vital co-ordination between the wings of the government may have been delayed thanks to this; such poor co-ordination has been noted in the past also when a CMG has not been the nodal body for security matters, such as during the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai seven years ago. Messaging also suffers when a CMG does not depute one of its members to brief the public. Another purpose of the CMG would surely have been to thrash out in advance vexed questions such as whether it was more suitable to use infantry with experience of infiltrator tactics, or the National Security Guard, with training in urban counter-terror. Unfortunately, Pathankot - given that it follows a pattern clearly evident from the past - will not be the last such attempt to derail Mr Modi's outreach to Islamabad. Given that, have lessons been learnt about the importance of institutional resilience in the face of security emergencies?
Had a CMG been the focal body for decision-making on Pathankot, questions of accountability and responsibility would have been easier to tackle. Decisions would have been on the record, and their reasons understood. Incorrect assumptions could have been corrected, and errors of judgment learned from. As it stands, assigning responsibility and enforcing accountability is a more difficult endeavour. But it is one that must be carried out. This need not happen with a blaze of publicity, but it is important that it be done. There is no substitute for beefing up institutional robustness and enforcing accountability.
