Tuesday, February 18 was a historic day of sorts for India. Not only did it put the process of the formation of India’s 29th state into high gear, but also brought one of the country’s oldest demands for statehood to an end.
But even as one hopes that the flames of the Telangana movement are well and truly on their way to dying out in the near future, far to the east, a similar fire is still burning bright.
Gorkhaland, a proposed state for ethnic Nepalese who have been domiciled in northern Bengal for the past 300 years, shares a lot of similarities with Telangana. Like its southern counterpart, the demand for a separate Gorkhaland is old. In fact, it is older than Telangana. The demand for a separate administrative unit in Darjeeling has existed since 1907, when the Hillmen's Association of Darjeeling submitted a memorandum to Viceroy Lord Minto, demanding a separate administrative setup.
Also, like Telangana, Gorkhaland is a mass, people-based movement, one which has the full support of the ‘Indian Gorkhas’(As the Nepalese-Indian community calls itself).
Lastly, like Telangana, the struggle for a separate Gorkhaland has had an often violent history and is taking a huge toll on the very people who are carrying it out.
And like Telangana, Gorkhaland has its fair share of supporters and critics.
For supporters, mostly Indian Gorkhas, Gorkhaland is all about finally achieving an identity in India. Their forebears were always part of the landscape that makes up the proposed Gorkhaland. Indeed, Darjeeling itself was Nepalese territory in 1780, when the Gorkha rulers of Nepal wrested it from the Chogyal of Sikkim. Darjeeling thus became part of the Kingdom of Nepal under the Shah Dynasty, which stretched across the Himalayas, from the Satluj in the west to the Teesta in the east. However, when Nepal lost to the all-conquering British in the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814-1816, it was forced to give up one-third of its territory (including Darjeeling) in return for recognition. This was the landmark Treaty of Sugauli in 1815. In the years after the treaty, more Nepalese came and settled in British-controlled territories in India, mostly to serve as soldiers (the famous Gurkhas), but also in other occupations.
A century later, Nepal signed a treaty with independent India: the 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The treaty allowed free movement of people and goods between the two nations.
It is this treaty, say most Indian Gorkhas, which has left them with an identity-crisis to contend with. With migrants from Nepal entering India on a regular basis in search of employment, the identities of both communities are often conflated as one in popular imagination and consciousness. The Indian Gorkhas thus feel cheated at being considered as foreigners and migrants instead of being full citizens.
There is also the issue of being discriminated against by Bengali-dominated governments in Kolkata. Such regimes, say the proponents, made up mostly of Bengalis, can never fully understand the real issues concerning the Nepalese of the hills. Consequently, they say, their region has been left behind most of Bengal.
On the other hand, detractors (and there are many) have many reasons of their own to oppose Gorkhaland. One of these, they say, is the fact that the Nepalese are not the original inhabitants of the Darjeeling Hills. That honour belongs to the Bhutias and most importantly, to the Lepchas.
The other, more sinister charge against Gorkhaland is that its proponents are fifth columnists for ‘Greater Nepal’, a concept popular among some Nepalese nationalists, which aims to restore Nepal to its ‘Satluj-to-Teesta’ borders prior to the Anglo-Nepalese War. Once Gorkhaland is achieved, say detractors, it will merge with Nepal once again.
Whatever the merits and demerits of these arguments, the ground reality is that both sides have held steadfastly to their views. The agitation for Gorkhaland saw a popular revival of sorts between 1986-88 under Subhash Ghisingh and the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF). It then waxed and waned until 2007 when Bimal Gurung and his Gorkha Janmukti Morcha revived it again. In both agitations, the people of the hills have become hostages of their own struggle. Bandh after bandh in the area and rivalry between rival Gorkha outfits has had a crippling effect on the region and its economy, which is mainly driven by tea and tourism.
On the other side, the rulers of Bengal too have been equally adamant. First, the Communists and then, the TMC under Mamata Banerjee, who famously declared that ‘Bengal cannot undergo another partition’ – they have ensured a stalemate.
More worryingly, the area where the proposed Gorkhaland is located is strategically important and vulnerable. Here, India is sandwiched between three nations, namely Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. At its narrowest point, only 14 miles of Indian territory separates the borders of Nepal and Bangladesh. Through it, runs a single-track railroad which carries freight and people between the Northeast and the rest of India. Any foreign invasion (by the Chinese, for instance) could choke this ‘Chicken’s Neck’ and severe the connection between the Northeast’s 45 million people and the rest of India.
That the Gorkhaland issue needs redressal is no longer in doubt. But if there is one thing that the T-affair has taught us, it is that formation of new states in India should not be on the basis of emotive demands or political expediency. Instead, it should be based on administration and administration alone. And while Gorkhaland has all the hallmarks of identity-politics, fact remains that administration too is an issue here. The area after all is under-developed.
Whatever the case, in the aftermath of the resolution of Telangana, the GJM and its cohorts have vowed to renew their agitation.
Rather than subject the hills to another round of crippling bandhs, it is time that the central government set up a new States Re-organisation Commission and clinically examine the Gorkhaland issue. If the T-issue could be solved, so can Gorkhaland.
