Air force sans planes?

The air chief marshal's letter to the defence minister, pointing to the steady decline in superiority over Pakistan, has found its way to the press and makes for somewhat distressing reading. What should cause even more worry is that this is not the first time that the air force has had to make the same point; previous air chiefs have done so, too""with little corrective action. The failure to buy new aircraft, the growing shortage of spares and the inevitable cannibalisation of some planes in order to keep others in the air, and the resultant lack of operational effectiveness for large numbers of squadrons, all these point to prolonged systemic failure. The country as a whole remains largely unaware of the incipient crisis because defence matters are secret and issues like this one are not aired publicly in the ordinary course""for understandable reasons. But now that the matter has become public, will some answers be forthcoming from the government? For instance, is it the case that in the event of war with Pakistan, India will not be able to quickly establish air superiority and command of the skies? Or the navy bottle up Karachi port, as was done in 1971?

Everyone knows that the business of defence procurement has been a victim of repeated scandals, starting with that over Bofors howitzers 20 years ago. The common refrain is that officers are chary of taking a position on any weapon for fear of being tarred later, and therefore no acquisition decisions get taken. Various defence ministers in the last two decades have tried to put in place new systems and procedures that would simultaneously curb corruption (remember the Tehelka tapes), and speed up the acquisition process. Nothing seems to have worked so far.

One result is that budget outlays for defence hardware have remained unspent year after year. This shows up in the sharp drop in defence expenditure as a share of GDP. Since the economic reforms that began in 1991 included fiscal correction, defence spending has been one of the areas where there has been a significant squeeze applied. In almost no year since then has defence spending been more than 2.5 per cent of GDP, and the current level is close to a historic low of 2.25 per cent. In contrast, the norm in the two decades to 1991 was between 2.5 per cent and 3 per cent, peaking in the later 1980s at 3.38 per cent, which is when Bofors happened. The appropriate level of spending on defence depends on many factors, including threat perceptions and the overall security environment. Observers have noted that in the Indian context, the appropriate level would be 3 per cent of GDP. If so, there is significant under-spending on defence, and somewhat dangerously the squeeze has been applied hardest on hardware acquisition""as might be expected, because the soldiers have to be fed and paid and therefore no cuts can be applied on routine day-to-day costs. The air chief's letter to the defence minister suggests that this drawn-out process has created a dangerous situation in terms of fighting capability. Does the government have a response?