Ajai Shukla: Too little, and too late

The Iraq Study Group Report has failed to chart a coherent way forward for the US in the impasse in Iraq.

A month ago, the Iraq Study Group (ISG) Report would have seemed explosive with its first sentence, "The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating," and its call for a radical new approach to the US adventure in that unfortunate country. But a week ago, the release of the 142-page report turned out to be a damp squib, the entire fireworks display having already played out through multiple leaks of its contents during the days preceding its release. Its damning assessment "" that Iraq was well along on the road to nowhere "" had also been conveyed by the cold-eyed declaration of incoming Secretary of Defence Robert Gates that America was not winning in Iraq.

Nevertheless, as the first officially linked attempt to look for a bipartisan solution on Iraq, the ISG Report, its reception by the Bush administration and its critics, and its likely outcome deserve careful examination. The proposals are of two kinds: internal, or what needs to be done inside Iraq, and external or the diplomatic initiatives with Iraq's neighbours.

The internal solution is relatively straightforward: concentrate on training Iraqi forces so that Americans can progressively hand over responsibility to them and pull out of Iraq by the end of 2007. Fifteen US combat brigades are proposed to be withdrawn from Iraq by the end of next year, while US military trainers are quadrupled quickly from the present figure of 4,000. By early 2008, the only US troops left in Iraq would be trainers, small units "embedded" in Iraqi brigades and (like in Afghanistan) independent Special Forces units directly fighting al-Qaeda. The ISG Report suggests that clear milestones be laid out for the Iraqi government to follow, and further US support be made conditional on Baghdad's compliance.

A simultaneous set of external initiatives includes direct diplomatic approaches to so far untouchable neighbours like Iran and Syria for creating conditions in Iraq that would allow Baghdad to implement US milestones. Noticeably absent in the ISG recommendations is any talk of bringing democracy to west Asia, one of the principle US aims of intervention in Iraq. Now, along with working hand-in-hand with fully paid up members of the Axis of Evil, the report suggests directly engaging the broader Arab-Israeli conflict, addressing the Israel-Palestine dispute as well as Israel's disputes with Syria and Lebanon.

By American standards, this is enormously sophisticated; there are signs of recognition that different areas of west Asian conflict feed upon common grievances. Co-chairman, Lee Hamilton, declared to the audience while releasing the report, "In the Middle East, everything is connected to everything else."

The report is being pitched as a triumph of bipartisanship, with five democrats and five republicans producing unanimous recommendations. Its impassioned plea is for bipartisan consensus at a time of national crisis. But instead of bringing together previously feuding parties, the report has been opposed, sometimes vehemently, by almost every party concerned. For those inclined to stay the course in Iraq, it is a shameful surrender that brings alive the memories of Vietnam. For those who have advocated a cut-and-run policy, the report is too slow in pulling out of Iraq, in its wish to placate those more mindful of American prestige. For President George W Bush, himself, without whose acceptance this report is no more than a piece of paper, the report goes directly against his instinct to complete the job in Iraq. For those inclined towards balanced solutions, the ISG Report is too little, too late.

With Baghdad, in effect, left holding the baby after a US withdrawal into Fortress America, it is unsurprising that some of the harshest criticism has come from Iraq. President Jalal Talabani, a Kurdish leader, has slammed the proposal to set milestones for Iraq, the bringing back of former members of the Baath Party into positions of power, and the embedding of US forces into Iraq's military. For the Kurds, the reports' implied proposals to parcel out power along ethnic lines and the proposal to hand over to Baghdad control of oil revenues, is a blow to the hard-won Kurdish autonomy and interests. Opposition from Shia groups has been equally vehement. Underlying the ISG Report, it brings out in the open the struggle between two conflicting streams of thought within the Republican Party. The realists within the GOP, including old-time Republicans like James Baker and Robert Gates have for long taken a back seat to the neo-conservative lobby that took control of White House policy at the time of 9/11, propagating the theory of using American military power to advance democracy around the world. Now, discredited from Iraq and mortally wounded after the mid-term elections and the departure of Donald Rumsfeld, the neo-conservative thinkers are mounting concerted attacks against the ISG Report, which has been influenced heavily by realist thinkers on its panel, like Baker, Gates and former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger.

William Kristol, the neoconservative editor of The Weekly Standard and a leading advocate of the decision to invade Iraq, in his commentary on the ISG Report, outlined the contours of this ideological schism: "The Baker report is now the vehicle for those Republicans who want to extricate themselves from Iraq, while [Senator John] McCain is articulating the strategy for victory in Iraq. Bush will have to choose, and the Republican Party will have to choose, in the very near future between Baker and McCain."

But James Baker, that seasoned and reasonable negotiator, has negotiated from his bipartisan panel a report that fails to offer a clear-cut, coherent way forward in the impasse in Iraq. With his ingrained negotiator's inclination to steer clear of unpalatable solutions, Baker's report produces a series of recommendations that leave the President with such a wide range of options "" either on actions within Iraq or on talking to Iran and Syria "" that Bush could do almost anything without falling afoul of the report. And so the report manages to generate an entirely negative contribution. While clearly establishing that the US administration has failed miserably in Iraq, it fails to chart a new course to follow.

The ball is now in the court of the US President. George W Bush, in any case, is awaiting the three more major study group reports before he decides on whether a direction change is needed in Iraq. If the others are as insipid and unimaginative in charting out a new bold plan the President could claim he has held consultations and still hold on to his old course of action.

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