The issue of corruption has been dominating public discourse over the last few months. The winter session of Parliament was paralysed on this issue. While the prime minister has made it one of his priorities, a Group of Ministers (GoM) has been constituted and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has been making dramatic arrests. The public expects quick punishment of those who are guilty but is highly skeptical, and rightly so.
The slow-moving reality is best illustrated by two recent high-profile cases. One is the case of a former chief secretary of Uttar Pradesh who has been recently convicted by a special court. The judgment has been challenged in the next higher court. What is noteworthy is that the matter relates to land allotment in Noida in 1992 and from newspaper accounts, the relevant material and evidence were all in the government's files. The other case relates to the individual who was chief vigilance commissioner (CVC) until the other day, and against whom there is a criminal case along with others in a matter relating to some imports in 1991-92 where, again, all the relevant material also seems to be in the government's files. The state government, with political changes after elections, alternated between deciding to pursue the case and to drop it. The Supreme Court in 2007 gave a stay order. As the petitioner, a former chief minister of Kerala, is no longer alive, the Court recently took the view that it is no longer required to take a decision on the substance of the petition and the trial court can now proceed in the matter.
The absence of finality even after about two decades in both these cases, where all the relevant material and evidence is in government files, shows how deep the malaise is. Surely, it should not take that long to establish in a credible, transparent, fair and just manner the issue of culpability and the punishment — administrative or judicial — that may be warranted. This is where the system is truly dysfunctional, and until it is recognised as being so and a coherent strategy drawn up to fix it, there is unlikely to be any material change.
The problem is that every complaint and every case is treated on a par, with procedure and process being paramount, with no focus on outcomes. It is driven by two contradictory premises. One is the standard and correct liberal premise of presumption of innocence until proved guilty. The other is the growing presumption of wrongdoing in each case of loss — real or presumed — or of deviation from procedure, and that too, with the paranoid assumption of a conspiracy of all those who have dealt with the file. These contradictions play themselves out in learned, lengthy examinations in virtually independent line hierarchies intrinsic to the highly evolved system of checks and balances within the government, to ensure that the final decision is the right one. With limitations of resources in terms of personnel and their time, the system gets increasingly clogged.
An ordinary common sense management approach would help. The key would be to determine the backlog in each part of the chain — the courts, the CBI and the vigilance wings of government agencies — and see what can be done with existing resources to clear it in a time-bound manner. Intrinsic to this would be the burden of choice and of setting priorities. A mechanism of independent credible panels of experts of known integrity for such decisions in each segment may be the only way to achieve this, as individuals in a line hierarchy would find it very difficult, if not impossible, to take such a responsibility.
If the courts can handle only a certain number of cases, one should prioritise. Cases with evidence of actual pay-offs or of assets disproportionate to means should be segregated and given the highest priority, with insistence on day-to-day hearings, as getting convictions in such matters should be easy. For the balance, a management view would require sifting on the basis of the gravity of the offence and the strength of the case. For cases which get low priority and cannot be expected to be handled in a reasonable period of time, it may be worthwhile to pursue plea bargains with modest penalties or even consider withdrawing them, to be dealt with administratively through departmental proceedings. Such an approach has never been adopted. It would not be easy, as taking such decisions and doing so in a manner that appears objective and acceptable would not be easy. Getting public acceptance and a political consensus for it would also be a challenge requiring credible leadership, transparency and communication.
Extending this approach of sifting cases to the CBI would be even more useful. Given better technologies and empowerment for tracking money, the CBI should be able to increase the percentage of cases with evidence of payoffs and assets disproportionate to means and get quick convictions. Cases where the evidence is restricted to material in government files should be restricted to those where the wrongdoing is so blatant that conviction can be reasonably expected. Closing cases altogether or returning them for administrative action to reduce the backlog would free scarce resources to better complete investigations, get evidence of actual payments and pursue trials effectively in courts.
When it comes to vigilance wings within government organisations, the case for effective filtration and speedy decision-making is equally strong, as the general perception is that the 'big fish' are rarely troubled and the system is overloaded with cases based on personally motivated complaints and very often relating to somewhat minor lapses. Some tolerance for minor mistakes would go a long way in reducing the workload. Accountability for time-bound action in the substantive 'big' cases would then be easier to enforce.
There is increasing skepticism among the general public about registration of cases, raids and even arrests. Outcomes such as dismissals from service or convictions by courts are what the public expects, along with credibly independent oversight mechanisms to ensure quick results.
