The Supreme Court on Tuesday said it was disturbed by the affidavit from the director of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Ranjit Sinha, on how the status report he had submitted to the court on the agency's investigation into coal block allocations was shown first to the law minister and to senior bureaucrats at their request. The Supreme Court's observation came at the same time as Mr Sinha's affidavit precipitated a crisis among the law officers of the United Progressive Alliance. Attorney General Goolam Vahanvati had led the Supreme Court to believe that the executive had not seen the status report, which is now revealed to be untrue. Additional Solicitor General Harin Raval, apparently dismayed, has publicly repudiated Mr Vahanvati's assurance, and written a letter to him, released openly, on the links between law officers, the law ministry, and ongoing CBI investigations.
Regardless of Mr Raval's letter, he was party to the deception of the Supreme Court, and his resignation on Tuesday was only to be expected. Mr Vahanvati, too, is in the same position, and surely cannot expect to continue in his post; if he does not resign, he must be asked to leave. And what of Law Minister Ashwani Kumar, who apparently asked to see the status report? The Supreme Court has asked the CBI to provide information on whether informing the law minister of the details of a court-supervised investigation is routine, what changes Mr Kumar had sought in the status report and whether these were incorporated. If Mr Kumar's vetting of the report is not routine, or if the changes he made were substantive, he too must quit. Moreover, it is clear that a root-and-branch clean-up of the investigative and legal system of the executive is needed. Rather than letting the Supreme Court step in, the current government must recognise the public mood and implement immediately the long-delayed project to ensure that the CBI director is appointed by a committee including the leader of the Opposition. It is also necessary for the government to review the degree to which the CBI remains institutionally dependent on police forces that are also under government control.
Cynics will point out that control of CBI cases has become too crucial to be given up easily for a government to control its parliamentary alliance. However, it should be plainly obvious that it is now becoming more of a public liability than an asset for the government. The CBI itself has long resisted an independent prosecutorial office, on the grounds that it has one in-house. If so, the question must be asked: why does it always run to the government's law officers and the law ministry for legal nuance? In any case, it is perhaps equally important to ensure the systemic independence of government law officers. If the CBI provides investigative cover to elements in the government, law officers provide legal cover for their decisions. Either way, accountability and consistency are the victims. As with the CBI director and the proposed new director of prosecutions in the CBI in the Lok Pal Bill, senior law officers should be appointed by a committee and be structurally insulated from political influence.
The prime minister himself should move to make these changes immediately. There is no need for him to resign now unless it is established he knew that irregular procedures were being put into place to monitor and tutor the CBI. But he should be aware that his reputation is in tatters and the government is left with no credibility. Swift action to put into place genuine independence for the CBI and law officers will work to change that.
