Last week, a US-based journalist asked me if the euphoria over the Paris Agreement on climate change had dissipated altogether. No doubt, there has been limited public discourse about climate governance after Paris. Yet, under the surface, this is the season of negotiations. Four parallel negotiations are underway - at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Montreal Protocol, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and regarding the International Solar Alliance (ISA) - and they all matter for international climate cooperation.
Going into the Paris negotiations, India was seen to have four strategies. First, showcase its domestic actions, whether increasing energy efficiency in industry and appliances, setting high targets for renewable energy, or spending large sums on climate adaptation. Its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution packaged this information. Secondly, apply pressure on the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. India repeatedly argued that its climate plans were disproportionately more ambitious than other major emitters. Thirdly, India wanted to secure means of implementation, namely finance, technology and capacity. Here, the results were underwhelming. Fourthly, India was keen on collaborating with other countries to create new partnerships. It promoted the ISA with France and also joined the US-led Mission Innovation. In this year's negotiations, India has to pursue similar strategies, smartly.
At the UNFCCC (parties will meet in Marrakesh in November), many developing countries are concerned about the fulfilment of pre-2020 commitments of developed nations. Momentum in climate action can only be maintained if there is clarity about how higher levels of finance would become available. Advanced economies had committed to providing $100 billion by 2020 from a variety of sources. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) has mobilised only $10 billion. Until May 2016, $36.4 billion of climate financing had been pledged across 26 funds but only $15.5 billion approved. With limited public funds contributed, there is regular talk of "leveraging" private capital but that, too, remains far short of needs. India's solar targets (of 100 gigawatts), alone, need $100 billion of debt financing. The balance between pre- and post-2020 climate commitments will impact the trust necessary to implement the Paris Agreement. The initial enthusiasm around Paris has become tepid because exuberance for the future (post-2020) has clouded inaction in the present.
Meanwhile, the approach that helped to get a deal at Paris has been abandoned for negotiations on phasing down hydrofluourocarbons (HFCs) under the Montreal Protocol or for reducing aviation emissions under ICAO. In both cases, developed countries are insisting on a top-down approach, rather than allowing each country to determine its most optimum pathway to limiting emissions. HFC negotiations will reach a critical juncture in October in Kigali, Rwanda. Whereas everyone agrees that HFCs are far more potent than carbon dioxide in terms of global warming potential, the disagreement is over the date to freeze HFC emissions: Developed countries want 2020-21; India wants 2030-31. Most of India's emissions occur after 2030, hence its preference for a later date. But the proposal lets China off the hook, which will emit 31 per cent of HFC emissions in 2050 (against India's seven per cent). So it makes sense for all countries to agree on an HFC phase-down but differentiate among them in terms of action. Let the biggest emitters start freezing and lowering emissions at an earlier date. Let others join as soon as alternative technologies are available at lower costs. This approach is not on the table but India should insist upon it.
Elsewhere, ICAO (the General Assembly meets next week in Montreal) has proposed a formula based on "revenue tonne-kilometres" (RTKs i.e. weight of revenue passengers and freight multiplied by kilometres flown) as a proxy for emissions, which would have to be offset through market-based measures. Analysing RTKs in nearly 140 countries, my colleagues find that India might have to offset up to 10 billion RTKs annually by 2030 (compare against a current total of 6 billion RTKs). Further, RTKs do not distinguish between types of aircraft. So, Indian carriers (with relatively newer and more efficient aircraft) are treated at par with much older aircraft belonging to American or European ones. Moreover, the proposal (likely to change next week) is structured in a manner that excludes (developed) Belgium but includes (developing) India! To counter these oddities, India must insist on counting actual emissions (not RTKs), initial inclusion of all developed countries, and delayed obligations for developing economies.
The fourth negotiation on ISA's legal form, structure and activities is critical because India has a stake in ISA's success. It is important not to lose focus on the potential for collaborative R&D and demand aggregation to trigger innovation. At home, India has just launched a programme to stimulate R&D for HFC alternatives with the aim that firms would pool resources and reduce costs and time in developing new technologies. Again these efforts on technology cooperation have to be highlighted and evaluated at UNFCCC, Montreal Protocol and ISA meetings.
In an increasing fragmented world of climate governance, the four negotiations hold promises and perils. They will strengthen climate action if they recognised the efforts of developing countries, imposed greater obligations on bigger emitters, followed a bottom-up flexible approach, increased means of implementation, and developed effective partnerships. If they did not, incoherence and mistrust will mar the post-Paris mood.
The writer is CEO, Council on Energy, Environment and Water (http://ceew.in)
Twitter: @GhoshArunabha
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