'Atmospherics of the US-India relationship'

I will confine my timeline on prospects for the US-India relationship to the next two years, before the inauguration of the next American President.

Let me say at the outset only a few words about my view of (Narendra) Modi's foreign policy, which is pertinent to my subject today. It seems to me that this iconic quote from (Jawaharlal) Nehru in 1947 in his first broadcast as vice-president of the interim Indian government provides a useful compass for our discussion, "As far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even wider scale."
 

As with this very early Nehru quote, Modi's foreign policy approach has, in my judgement, reflected no ideological component. He seeks to raise India's bilateral relationships with the major powers (the US, China, Russia and Japan) to a higher level and thereby enlist them to facilitate India's domestic economic development, while not allowing any of these bilateral interactions to infect any of the others. This is not a non-aligned, but a multi-aligned Indian foreign policy, avoiding choosing any one of these major bilateral relationships over any of the others.

This does not mean that the Prime Minister has equal sympathy for the political systems and societies of these major states (he naturally finds the US more attractive than China and Russia in these respects). Rather, his wish for their help in India's economic rise trumps at least for the medium term his distaste for their autocratic internal political arrangements and, unless it directly affects India, even their destabilising external policies. How India would behave as a balancer in the Indo-Pacific and beyond if under the Prime Minister's leadership in the next five years it substantially increases its internal strength and consequent power projection remains unclear, at least to me.

It in this context that the atmospherics of the US-India relationship are obviously much improved since we last met in Washington, symbolised most vividly by President (Barack) Obama's upcoming Republic Day visit. Praise be, the (Devyani) Khobragade affair and Modi visa issues are well behind us. In the context of renewing and modernising by late June the 10-year framework for the US-India defence relationship, defence sales and military-to military interaction now led by our friend Ash Carter at the Pentagon and the new Indian Defense Minister will prosper, including on developing India's next-generation aircraft carrier and increased technology transfer. And while lofty joint language may be released during the late January summit on smart-cities, public health and so on, progress in the next two years on these subjects will be much less charged than the rhetoric.

We will also see during this period US decisions to sell to India unconventional oil and gas, and to accelerate US-India space cooperation. On the bilateral economic front, US FDI (foreign direct investment) will substantially increase in the next two years, if the Modi government moves ahead with economic reforms, including on revising and lifting the FDI caps in insurance, e-commerce, and other sectors.

However, regarding multilateral trade, strong American supporters of the transformation of US-India relations who have worked on trade issues with New Delhi turn positively red in the face when they speak about India's policies in multilateral trade negotiations. Worst in the world, they assert. So that subject is unlikely to be smooth sailing ahead in the bilateral relationship. Fixing the widely recognised problems of the nuclear liability law has thus far been beyond the capacity of many smart people on both sides. Hopefully, the new focused bilateral contact group can pull US nuclear reactors out of the Indian legal hat.

India and the US are currently far from being operational "natural allies" to use former Prime Minister (Atal Bihari) Vajpayee's term, except in the very long run. Indeed, it is striking how little the two nations presently have in common on major issues in the diplomatic arena in any practical way.

As we all know, the US military is on its way out of Afghanistan by the end of 2016. I find it difficult to be optimistic about that tragic nation. In my mind, the major question is not whether the Taliban will continue to make major gains in the country, but whether we will see elements of an Iraqi army-like collapse by the Afghanistan security forces. In any event, the US will increasingly leave managing the aftermath of its long military intervention in Afghanistan to India and Afghanistan's other neighbours, notably Pakistan. Pakistan's military will not change its fundamental objective to maximise its influence in Afghanistan at the expense of India, including through its terrorist surrogates. Washington is likely to resist this embracing conclusion regarding Pakistan's malignant objectives in Afghanistan, instead choosing to believe yet again as so often in the past that there have been multiple encouraging epiphanies throughout the Pakistan general staff and ISI regarding Afghanistan and India. The policy difference regarding Pakistan and Afghanistan and US military assistance to Pakistan will likely become a bone of contention in the US-India relationship and will at the same time push India closer to Iran.

So, in conclusion, where does that leave us with respect to US strategy toward India during the next two years? In my judgement, at best our expectations should be modest. Unlike at the beginning of the last decade, neither this Prime Minister nor this President will put the strategic transformation of US-India relations in a pre-eminent place in their overall policy agendas. There will, therefore, in my judgement be no real strategic partnership between the two countries in the next two years. If India moves ahead with its domestic economic reforms and thus encourages US business to further enter the Indian market, and the US has some patience and does not attempt to pressure the Modi government to damage any of its other major bilateral relationships, we can together make incremental progress on some of the bilateral issues, which is not to be dismissed.

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An edited excerpt from the Ananta Aspen Centre's 'Viewpoint' series delivered by former US Ambassador to India, Robert D Blackwill in New Delhi in January, 2015