The short answer to the above is “all three” — good, bad and indifferent — depending on where we look. In the multitude of articles, assessments and editorials that have appeared after UPA-II’s first anniversary in May, the government has been given due credit for its distinguished leaders, high growth, people-friendly legislation on right to information and right to education, poverty alleviation measures like rural employment scheme, and so on.
On the other hand, it has received negative or indifferent rating for a large number of pending Bills, multiple voices within the Cabinet without any sense of collective responsibility, Naxal violence, lack of action against corrupt and negligent ministers, its extreme dependence on small parties without a shared ideology, and poor governance.
On the face of it, all this is fair, and it is difficult to disagree with any of it — for or against. The crucial issue, however, in judging the performance of UPA-II is completely different. It is to ask ourselves whether any other formation or government could have done better in the type of coalition politics that India has experienced over the past 20 years.
There is nothing wrong with coalition governments or multi-party governments per se. However, what is wrong in India’s case is that, as a result of some recent amendments to the Constitution, political parties, large and small, have been given absolute authority over elected representatives of the people in state legislatures and Parliament.
We continue to have a vibrant democracy “of the people” at the time of elections. However, once elections are over, party leaders become supreme. Elected members have little role in deciding which parties or programmes to support from time to time. In practice, after elections, a government in office is dependent for survival on an “oligarchy” of large as well as a few small party leaders.
To appreciate the absolute power of party leaders over elected representatives, just consider the process of recently concluded elections to Rajya Sabha, the so-called “Council of States” in our federal democracy. In theory, members of legislatures are expected to vote and elect their representatives in this Council to represent interests of their state. In actual practice, however, Central and regional leaders of parties decide the names of their nominees. Elected representatives in states have to compulsorily vote for whoever has been nominated by their party leaders. If they don’t, the so-called “anti-defection” law applies to the dissenting legislators and they lose their own seats !
Moreover, domicile requirement for a person to be elected to the Council of States has also been dropped by a recent amendment. Thus, a person who is not a resident — and who may have no familiarity with state issues — may be elected to Rajya Sabha if the party leader so decides. Then there is the trading and exchange of minority votes among different parties. Thus, if party “X” has some left-over votes in a particular state, it can easily exchange those with a party in another state. In this process, the exchanged members of legislatures again have no option but to compulsorily vote for the known or unknown resident of another state.
Interestingly, anti-defection law does not apply to small parties which join a government. Thus, there is a built-in incentive for any leader to form a separate party with even four or five members. If he or she is the leader of a small party, that person commands a huge premium and is sought after by dominant parties for support.
A consequence, perhaps unintended, of this cozy arrangement among small and large parties is that, even after a new government is formed, the option to switch sides is still open for a party if circumstances so warrant or if there is a difference of views on a Cabinet decision (as indeed happened on the nuclear issue in UPA-I).
In this situation, does it make any sense to give ratings to a coalition government like UPA-II, which is dependent on a number of small parties, which are free to switch sides or withdraw support whenever they wish? Consider a counter-factual situation. Can we, as citizens and commentators, think of any other combination of parties in the present Lok Sabha which could have successfully delivered more than UPA- II did during its first year in office? Let us, as citizens of a democratic but oligarchic state, be grateful for stability of the present government and whatever we are able to get from it.
An unstable government led by unscrupulous or corrupt leaders (as is currently the case in some of our states) would make things even worse — unless we are able to introduce some political reforms which make can small parties that join a government more accountable. A simple solution to the problem of disproportionate powers of party leaders, irrespective of the size of their parties in a coalition, is to make the anti-defection law applicable to all parties, large and small. At the same time, individual elected members should be extended immunity from party whips in conduct of business in Parliament and state legislatures (except during a “trust” vote to test the majority of the government in power).
There is a lot more to be done by way of post-election political reforms, which I have elaborated elsewhere, to make our democracy “by the people” and also work “for the people”. I hope that newly constituted National Advisory Council (NAC), and other civil society organisations, would give attention to some of these “systemic” political issues affecting governance in addition to other issues of current interest.
Bimal Jalan is former RBI governor and author of “The Future of India — Politics, Economics and Governance”
