Crunch time

Finally, it is crunch time on the nuclear deal. The negotiators have come back from Vienna with "India-specific safeguards" having been agreed on with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to give effect to what has been negotiated with the US. Nothing has been officially stated, but the word is that the IAEA arrangements are satisfactory, and do not impinge on the country's strategic nuclear programme. Now the government needs to work out waivers and supply clearances with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Before that, however, it has to get the green signal from its Left allies "" who have threatened to withdraw support if the deal goes through. Technically, the government could go ahead anyway, since it does not need Parliament's approval. However, government spokesmen have said they will not risk losing their parliamentary majority in order to go ahead with the deal. And the BJP, under Mr Advani, is unlikely to extend support. In effect, therefore, Prakash Karat has a veto on the subject, and there is nothing in his stance so far which suggests that he is willing to compromise. As he has said, his opposition is not so much to the deal per se but to the American embrace of India. Meanwhile, time is running out.

It goes without saying that failure to conclude the deal will be a serious setback for the country "" and a black mark on the parties who block it. Mr Karat should be able to see that nothing of the kind proposed is possible without the US taking the lead. So he has to decide whether his dislike of the US over-rides his commitment to India's own interests. As for the BJP, whose NDA government was willing to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and which was playing for much smaller stakes in the situation immediately after the nuclear tests of 1998, the much greater freedom given to India in the 123 agreement seems to be too big a bone to swallow. To mask its embarrassment, it has focused attention on some questionable clauses in the Hyde Act, although the government's negotiators have explained that, especially once the US Congress approves the 123 agreement, it is the negotiated deal and its clauses that bind India "" the Hyde Act is only an enabling law that allows the US to make an exception for India when it comes to nuclear cooperation. It is in this sense that the entire package is a breakthrough, allowing India to retain its strategic programme while coming out of the technology- and fuel-denial regime that has been in place for a third of a century. To be sure, the US and other countries may once again withdraw cooperation if India conducts another nuclear test, but the fall-out of that will be no different from what exists today, so India is not worse off. And to the extent that the agreement allows India to stockpile nuclear fuel for its civilian nuclear programme, there is little risk of the country being held to ransom if it chooses to test again.

These are complex issues, and the government initially overstated what India would gain from the agreement. But India's negotiators have done an outstanding job "" which is not to say that there have been no compromises. The deal itself would not have been possible without the political push given by President Bush. If it is not signed before Mr Bush's term ends, and if he were to be succeeded by a Democrat president, it is a given that the whole thing will be dead and buried. Those hoping to re-negotiate better terms will then have to wait an awfully long time, during which the country can regret at its leisure a missed opportunity. One must hope that it won't come to that.