Egypt's story has just begun

The Arab Spring is not dead; we are beginning a long, arduous, messy and bloody process

Even as the crisis and polarisation in Egypt deepen, three key realities should be kept in mind. First, the military will not relent in its effort to crush the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies, and to consolidate its position as the sole authority in the country - at least for the time being. There is no possibility of accommodation with Mohamed Morsi's partisans; the hope that the deposed president might return to power is a flight of fancy. Things had already reached the point of no return the day the army, through General al-Sisi, decided to take matters into its hands. As the French writer Andre Malraux once said: "One does not cross the Rubicon to go fishing."

Second, neither the Americans nor the Europeans - or the Chinese or the Russians, for that matter - can expect to have any leverage or influence on the decisions that the military makes and will continue to make. Senior US officials tried hard to convince General al-Sisi not to act, but to no avail. The statement from US President Barack Obama after the worst episode of killing (so far) was, basically, a recognition of Washington's helplessness. The Egyptian military knows that the Americans will not cut off its $1.3-billion assistance, since that will mean opening the field even more to jihadists.

Even if the US were to cut off financial aid to Egypt, this would not stop General al-Sisi and the people around him. What is at stake in their confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies is more crucial to them than any amount of money, from anybody. Their determination is reinforced by the knowledge that if Western assistance were cut off, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates would step in. The Saudis and the Emiratis were aghast - or, to put it mildly, "deeply concerned" - at the prospect of the Muslim Brotherhood being able to consolidate its control on the most populous Arab country. They will do their best to support the new government.

Third, this is just the beginning of the struggle for power, and of the arduous and painful search for political and social stability - not only in Egypt but in all the countries of the Arab world that have been in the throes of popular uprisings. It is now politically correct among most of the pundit community to mourn the demise of the "promises of the Arab spring", to lament the "failure" of the democratic experiment in Egypt, and to wring one's hands about Mr Morsi being demoted and put under house arrest just a year after a "free democratic election".

This sounds more like wishful thinking and a tendency to indulge in rhetorical effects than cool-headed analysis. History is not like this: "Once upon a time the people decided to revolt, marched in the streets, were able to get rid of their dictator and then a constitution was written, elections were organised, and ... democracy is there." Even in an era of ever-accelerating changes, there are limits to the miracles of spontaneous generation - especially when it comes to installing democracy and sound institutions in countries.

The fact is that all the Arab uprisings were spontaneous. The pressure cooker just exploded because of the unrelenting build-up of pressure. There were no real leaders to corral the people into an organised force. The Muslim Brotherhood was originally hesitant to jump into something it had not started. But it realised the opportunity it was presented with, as the only organised opposition force, battle-hardened by decades of clandestine action and penetration of the multiple layers of Arab societies. Therefore, since the other forces were totally disorganised and everybody was clamouring for elections, some kind of power grab took place. The democratic electoral process was seen as window dressing.

However, the other elements in these societies - who had not risked their lives in the streets to see one dictatorship replaced by the pervasive grip of a religion-driven new power - were bound at some stage to question the relevance of the governments installed in that way. The total ineptitude of the Morsi regime in Egypt, or the pressures and terrorist tactics of the Salafist groups in Tunisia, would only aggravate their frustration, and the feeling that "their" revolution had been kidnapped.

Revolutions do not end in a happy morning. This is just the beginning of a long, arduous, messy and bloody process that will take years before a modicum of political and social stabilisation emerges, before different forces can find ways for a more or less peaceful accommodation, before a culture of dialogue and compromise can take hold.

In view of these sobering realities, one immediate priority should be to make Mr Morsi's partisans understand that their stance of confrontation with the military will only lead to more human casualties, and strengthen the process of Egypt's self-destruction. The fact is that the Muslim Brotherhood will remain a political force in Egypt. The question - for the military and the Brotherhood - is whether, despite the anger and the frustration on both sides, a way can be found to allow for the eventual reintegration of the Brotherhood in the political process.

The second priority is to ensure that the regime in Cairo can move fast towards some immediate actions that would help alleviate the desperate economic situation, and provide even a few tangible improvements in the daily life of the people. Mr Morsi's total failure to stem the continuous deterioration of the situation was a key factor that made millions of Egyptians applaud the military coup against him. The countries that claim to be concerned about the future of Egypt should focus on finding the most efficient way to assist in restarting the country's economy. This is a prerequisite for stability. 

The third priority is to internalise the fact that just because an election is held or a Constitution is written, democracy will not miraculously blossom. These are just individual elements, among others, of the building up of societies where dialogue and compromise - rather than confrontation and power grab - become the norm. The Arab world has just started a process. New mindsets, perceptions and aspirations generated by the uprisings are alive and well. To say that the Arab Spring will now be followed by the "Arab winter" is just another instance of fashionable, and artificial, hype.

The whole Arab world - even those parts that are still ruled by the most conservative regimes - has entered a process of transformational change that will take many years, even decades, with its phases of violence, reversals and breakthroughs. Don't expect a straight line. Be prepared for uncertainty and volatility; be humble in your advice; and read a history book about how long, painful and bloody was the establishment of democracy in Europe or in America.

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The writer is president of Smadja & Smadja
https://twitter.com/ClaudeSmadja