If public opinion is against increasing the share of nuclear power generation, then we don’t need the Bill. If we want more power, the Bill is absolutely critical.
Now that the Bill has been introduced in the Lok Sabha and referred to a Parliamentary Stranding Committee on Science and Technology, where do we go from here? Given the intensity of feeling and opposition to the Bill earlier, it would be useful from the public interest point of view to have a healthy, informed debate on the subject. Are there any criteria by which one could judge the “informedness” of the debate? This piece attempts to set out some of the basic issues involved.
The first is, what is the public opinion on the relevance of civil nuclear power in India? Should nuclear power generation contribute to meeting a substantial portion of the increasing demand for electric power in India, as is the case in many of the developed countries? This is an important criterion, since many of those opposed to the Bill are in principle opposed to anything to do with nuclear: nuclear weapons, nuclear power, nuclear family (?) etc. For them, opposition to the Bill is much more fundamental than merely the quantum of liability etc. In principle, no liability Bill, which has any chance of advancing nuclear power in India, is acceptable.
If the public opinion is strongly against nuclear power generation and there is no need to increase the share of nuclear power in total power generation in India, then the liability Bill is of no relevance. There won’t be any more nuclear power plants (NPPs) in India and we can do without a liability Bill as all the NPPs will be in the public sector and the public will in any case bear the bill for any liability claim. There won’t be any need to amend the Atomic Energy Act as well.
What if the sentiment is in favour of increasing the contribution of NPPs? The second criterion is, what should be the role of imported reactors, technologies, components and systems in advancing the role of NPPs in total power generation. If the three-stage indigenous programme turns out to be as successful as is anticipated, then the share of NPPs will increase. There is no doubt about that. What if it is not as successful as anticipated or the nation desires to have a much faster growth in nuclear power generation than is possible with indigenously developed reactors, thereby making imports necessary to achieve the higher rates of nuclear power generation?
If it is felt that the indigenous programme will be sufficient to take care of India’s future needs of electric power, with no need to import any reactors or systems or components from anywhere, then again there is no overwhelming need to have a Civil Nuclear Liability Bill. As before, the NPPs will all be owned and run by government-owned companies and the situation will prevail as of now, with the government — the public — obliged to pay the liability compensation amounts.
What, however, if it is felt that import of such items will contribute substantially to the increase in the share of nuclear power? Incidentally, this is a reason why the Bill should have been referred to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Energy than the one on Science and Technology. In the final analysis, the Bill is all about the future of electric power generation in India. In any case, are such imports possible without a liability Bill that conforms to the criteria set by international conventions? Unfortunately NO. In the current international environment, none of the major suppliers of nuclear equipment — US, France, Russia, Germany etc. — will supply any such item to a country that does not have a liability Act and does not conform to international standards. US firms have on more than one occasion expressed their desire for India to enact such an Act. This brings us to the second set of critics of the Bill. They are those who are opposed to the Bill because they perceive it as a response to solely US concerns. Is this true? Are there any grounds to believe that one or more suppliers will be willing to sell to India without a liability Act in the country? So far, in spite of all the agitations none has expressed such willingness. What about the French who, it is often alleged, would be willing to do so? Sadly, not only has any responsible French official or industry spokesperson ever admitted to such a policy, the India-France Cooperation Agreement on the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, signed in September 2009, requires that “each party shall create a civil nuclear liability regime based upon established international principles (Art. VIII (2)). Therefore, the French, too, are insistent that India enact a liability Bill. What about the others?
In June 2000, the governments of the Russian Federation and the French Republic signed a bilateral agreement to “govern issues of liability for nuclear damage in the event of a nuclear incident within the territory of the Russian Federation that results from deliveries from the French Republic to nuclear installations in the Russian Federation”. Specifically, Article III of the agreement stated:
- The Russian party shall bring no claims against the French party or against suppliers on grounds of nuclear damage resulting from a nuclear incident which has taken place within the territory of the Russian Federation.
- The Russian party shall grant the French party and the suppliers appropriate legal protection and shall exempt them from liability for damages in the event of claims by third parties on grounds of nuclear damage resulting from a nuclear incident which has taken place within the territory of the Russian Federation.
Earlier, Russia had signed a similar agreement with Germany in June 1998 which set out the rules of liability applicable to a nuclear incident in the Russian Federation involving German supplies. In such a case, the Russian Federation agreed not to institute liability proceedings against Germany or against any German supplier, and to ensure that they will receive sufficient legal protection and will not be held liable in respect of claims made by third parties. This agreement, by mutual consent, lapsed when the Russian Federation ratified the Vienna Convention.
It is very unlikely that Russia having agreed to such conditions before joining the Vienna Convention would itself be willing to agree to supply such items to India without India either agreeing to enact a legal liability regime in conformity with international practice or agreeing to a bilateral agreement in line with the Russia-France and Russia-Germany agreements.
So, it is fairly clear that no reputable international supplier will supply India with any nuclear equipment without a nuclear liability regime conforming to international practice being enacted in India.
So, really speaking, a healthy debate in India, assuming that there is an agreement on (i) the relevance of nuclear in India in future; (ii) the need to increase the share of nuclear power; and (iii) the need to import nuclear equipment from abroad to further increase the nuclear power share, will see in what manner the proposed Bill can be improved while keeping it within the criteria of international conventions. The current Bill does conform to such a practice. The debate should concentrate on the manner in which it can be improved.
The author is a strategic affair and nuclear policy analyst based in New Delhi
balachandrangopalan@hotmail.com
