The Lokpal could end up as just another bureaucracy, unless it is carefully designed, has sound processes, and is run by officials who share its vision and work hard for its success.
The Lokpal bill has raised enormous expectations, but as someone who has been Income Tax Ombudsman and Additional Secretary to the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), I believe that it is unlikely to have a major impact on corruption unless the architects of the bill recognise the ground realities, and the government follows through with major administrative reform.
Corruption can either be collusive or exploitative. In collusive corruption, the bribe taker and giver collude and do not leave any evidence. An example of this kind of corruption is a tax officer who finds a fraudulent entry in the books of a taxpayer but ignores it for a price. This sort of collusive corruption is widespread in our country; it will not come to light, and it cannot be stopped by a Lokpal.
Exploitative corruption, on the other hand, takes place when an official misuses his position to deny an innocent citizen what is his rightful due. Most cases of this sort come to light usually through complaints, often by disgruntled persons who are unhappy with an administrative decision. For example, a taxpayer who is being viciously harassed by a tax official will be forced to make such a complaint. The Lokpal can be effective in such cases if he takes the trouble to painstakingly gather evidence.
Unfortunately, many such complainants have an axe to grind. Many do not speak the truth and want to hound adversaries. When the CVC started to encourage complaints against officials from the public, it was flooded with so many such complaints that that it did not know how to cope with them. Without a lengthy inquiry, it was impossible to get to the truth. The Select Committee of Parliament, which is presently evaluating the Lokpal Bill, should insist on exemplary punishment to those guilty of false complaints.
Nonetheless, designing a strong, independent and effective Lokpal is important, especially for dealing with powerful politicians and officials. I found at the CVC that disciplinary authorities could not easily proceed against powerful senior officials on their own. But armed under the Commission’s umbrella, the officers could claim before their own superiors that they had no choice in the matter. This was especially evident during the aftermath of the Harshad Mehta scam, where action had to be taken against powerful CEOs of public sector banks in order to establish the primacy of banking laws over widespread illegal and informal practices.
One such law which the CVC sought to re-establish was the rule that a cheque meant for one person could under no circumstances be credited to the account of another. The widespread practice to the contrary had been one of the roots of the scam. Deterrent punishments by the Commission in these cases had the salutary effect of forcing bankers to adhere to the rules in the future.
Yet there were many other cases, particularly relating to the government, where the CVC’s advice was disregarded. The guilty were not prosecuted by the government for years. The Select Committee must recognise the government’s inherent reluctance to punish one of its own, and ensure that the Lokpal’s and CVC’s decisions are binding and given effect to immediately. Moreover, both institutions should have the power to initiate investigations on their own, suo moto, without waiting for a complaint or a reference from the government.
As Income Tax Ombudsman, I lacked credibility because I could not grant immediate relief to the taxpayer who had been a victim of an unfair tax officer. The Select Committee must ensure that the Lokpal does not meet this fate. Nothing builds credibility and confidence in the public more effectively than redressing a wrong quickly and transparently. The Jan Lokpal draft does have provisions to this effect. If it is decided not to give such powers to the Lokpal, in the interests of checks and balances, some other way should be found to redress the citizen’s grievance immediately.
On the whole, I believe, we must lower our expectations of the Lokpal. Even with the best design, it will not be able to prevent many types of collusive or exploitative corruption. The Lokpal is needed medicine which is administered once the patient is sick. But clearing swamps is a better way to tackle malaria than administering quinine. We need preventive measures in order to bring transparency and accountability in official decision making: one, reduce administrative discretion in order to shrink opportunities to manipulate public rules for private gain; two, penalise deliberate delay — the favoured tactic of a corrupt bureaucrat; three, ensure swift and certain punishment in disciplinary proceedings.
The CVC achieved far more success by forcing public sector banks to computerise operations and clear cheques electronically by a particular date than by prosecuting thousands of individual disciplinary cases. When bank transactions were expedited, bank managers lost discretionary control over thousands of crores of rupees. Rent-seeking opportunities were similarly reduced when the CVC banned post-tender negotiations (except with the lowest bidder) as part of procurement reform.
We also need to remember that the Lokpal could end up as just another bureaucracy, unless it is carefully designed, has sound processes and is run by a team of officials who share its vision and work hard for its success. Unfortunately, some critical appointments to the Central Vigilance Commission were made carelessly in the past, and corruption and inefficiency within the Commission also went unpunished. These were costly mistakes. We must learn from these experiences in designing new anti-corruption institutions such as the Lokpal, or strengthen older ones such as the CVC.
The author, formerly Income Tax Ombudsman, Mumbai, and Additional Secretary, Central Vigilance Commission, currently teaches public policy at the School of Inspired Leadership, Gurgaon
