The new external affairs minister, Salman Khurshid, is a welcome change from his predecessor, S M Krishna. While Mr Krishna never had anything of interest to say on any issue of significance, except perhaps when he was reading the speech of his Portuguese counterpart at the United Nations General Assembly, Mr Khurshid’s exuberance is rather infectious. It can only be hoped that it will translate into a more energetic foreign policy in 2013.
The most significant foreign policy challenge for New Delhi in the coming years is going to be one of dealing with the most important geopolitical event of our time: the rise of China. Despite an obsession among the Indian foreign policy elite with everything Chinese, it is not at all evident if New Delhi has learnt to think strategically about China and all that its rapid ascendance in global hierarchy implies for India.
If one day we are told that the Sino-Indian border talks are well on track, the next day it emerges that fundamental differences remain where they were a decade back. If one day New Delhi signals it is willing to co-operate with like-minded democracies in the Asia-Pacific, the next day there is a change of heart for fear of offending Chinese sensitivities. If one day India decides to explore hydrocarbons in the South China Sea, the next day there are indications that New Delhi may be having second thoughts.
In this context, Salman Khurshid has made some interesting interventions in recent days. He has suggested that India will have to accept “the new reality” of China’s presence in areas it considers exclusive and that “the real praise of India’s foreign policy will come in being able to combine the strengths without targeting the aspiration of anyone else in the world”. In a different media engagement, replying to a query on what was a bigger challenge for India – the territorial dispute with China or the trust deficit with Pakistan – Mr Khurshid was emphatic that “China is necessarily more important in terms of our global vision, in terms of economics … in terms of stability and impact of stability that our friendship and understating can have on Asia and South Asia.” He went on to underline that India has “learnt to manage them [Chinese]… We don’t want to be drawn into any dispute vis-à-vis China because we want to look at the positive as far as possible”.
Though nothing path-breaking, there is much in Mr Khurshid’s comments that merits attention. The recognition that the China challenge is the most potent one for India is a welcome change from the wishy-washy statements we are used to getting from our policy makers. Mr Khurshid also needs to be commended for recognising that there is nothing to be gained by peddling the outdated concepts of India’s exclusive spheres of influence.
Both the South Asian and Indian Ocean regions are being rapidly shaped by the Chinese presence. China’s rising profile in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region is no news. What is astonishing is the diminishing role of India and the rapidity with which New Delhi has ceded strategic space to Beijing in these regions, traditionally considered to be India’s periphery. Even as China was becoming the largest trade partner of most states in South Asia, including India, New Delhi has been busy repeating the old mantra of South Asia being India’s exclusive sphere of influence. This quiet assertion of China has allowed various smaller countries of South Asia and the Indian Ocean region to play China off against India. Most states in the region now use the China card to balance against the predominance of India. The smaller states, forced to exist between their two giant neighbours, have responded with a careful balancing act.
A mere acknowledgement from Mr Khurshid that China's presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean is a reality that New Delhi will have to learn to live with, however, is not enough. What is needed is an assessment of how India, despite being the regional power, has not been able to assert its natural advantages and leadership position in its own periphery. And then to frame a response that allows India to effectively operate in China’s periphery the way China is operating around India’s. Just as in this day and age China doesn’t need India’s consent to expand its footprint in South Asia and Indian Ocean, India should also lose its diffidence about enhancing its own connectivity and, as a result, its profile in East and Southeast Asia.
China has consistently targeted Indian aspirations to emerge as a global player of significance. Contra Mr Khurshid, the real potency of Indian foreign policy will only be revealed if New Delhi can pay back in the same coin. Mr Khurshid may not want to be drawn into any conflict vis-à-vis China, but the hard reality is that Chinese actions and India’s lackadaisical attitude have already shaped a largely negative trajectory of Sino-Indian ties. New Delhi would do well to remember that nice guys often finish last. And in the high-stakes game of great power politics, finishing last is never an attractive option.
The writer is reader in International Relations, Department of Defence Studies at King’s College, London
