Hum, Tum, aur Woh log

President George Bush will be here in about 45 days. One of the things he will be expected to deliver is the nuclear deal that he signed with the Prime Minister last July, but it is unlikely that the US Congress will have first fallen in line and then done the needful by changing American laws before February-end. Nor is it clear that the US has given the thumbs up on India's plan of action to separate (as promised) its military and civilian nuclear facilities, in return for uranium and other goodies from the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (or NSG). The civilian facilities will be under international safeguards. If the deal goes through, India will have got de facto recognition as a nuclear power while the US will have put some limits on India's capacity to make nuclear bombs. Everyone should be happy, right?

Wrong. China and Pakistan, whose foreign policies remain unfulfilled unless they create problems for India, have got into the act. China has said that it will supply Pakistan with eight nuclear reactors at a cost of $8 billion. Not just Pakistan, says China, it will also supply Bangladesh with a couple of reactors. Since neither country needs civilian nuclear reactors because both have abundant gas supplies, the message is clear: if the US makes an exception in the case of India, China will seek to do the same for Pakistan and Bangladesh. This is a typical piece of Chinese gall, when you consider that it and Pakistan have been the worst nuclear proliferators. And it raises the question: the US may do its best, but can it carry the NSG (which includes China) with it?

Should India worry? Yes, not just because of the obvious reasons but also because the US will now up the ante with this country in order to persuade, or try to persuade, or appear to try to persuade, Pakistan and Bangladesh not to take up the Chinese offer. One crucial element in this complex minuets game is the Indian stand on Iran's nuclear ambitions. The US does not want India to support Iran and India has once voted against Iran, which got upset and said it would rethink the gas pipleline to India. But it soon said things could be sorted out. Many Indians think that since Iran needs to sell the gas to India, it is bluffing. But it does expect Indian support, as does a large and currently influential section of MPs.

The real question that India has to address is: if it is not in India's interest to have a nuclear-armed Iran, what, if anything, can India do about it? Is supporting the US a good option? If not, what other option is there? Besides which, can you blame Iran for concluding, after the Iraq invasion and the North Korean stand-off, that the only insurance against an American attack is possession of a nuclear button? And if the assumption is that no truly determined country can be prevented from going nuclear (and Iran has now declared its intentions), is it wise for India to earn Iran's lasting ire? These questions complicate the deal with the US because, while India would ideally like to do nothing to help Iran but also not move against that country, Washington has insisted that India cannot sit on the fence and must choose. The Bush visit should see some interesting discussions.