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At 34 paragraphs and over 3,600 words, the joint statement on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Japan earlier this week is perhaps as rare as the Japanese emperor's lunch invitation to the Indian prime minister. We do not know what was on the imperial kitchen's menu, but thanks to the joint statement, we do know a lot about the flavour of India-Japan relations.
The first substantive issue it mentions is the foreign minister's strategic dialogue, immediately followed by the ministerial level economic dialogue. Note how the strategic precedes the economic. Note how the next seven areas mentioned in that paragraph - concerning the two foreign and defence ministries, trilateral dialogue with the United States and issues such as cyber strategy and counter-terrorism - all cover geopolitical issues. A single mention of the word "economic" and then it's back to maritime affairs dialogue again.
The prominence accorded to strategic issues in the joint statement, including reference to the 2008 Manmohan Singh-Taro Aso declaration on security cooperation, is a reasonably good indicator of what is driving the bilateral relationship. To be sure, the bulk of the statement - 11 big paragraphs - concerns economics, development and trade. Yet, these paragraphs are sandwiched between those concerning geopolitical issues, for the statement goes into East Asian security architecture, UNCLOS and the freedom of navigation, Afghanistan, North Korean missiles, CTBT, UN reform and climate change before concluding.
There is a refreshing boldness in the substance and style of the new Japanese government under Shinzo Abe, as much to his foreign policy as to his economics. Abepolitik conceives of Japan as the key player in preserving "the peace, stability and freedom of navigation" in the Indo-Pacific region, which must stand up to a rising China's attempt to dominate and even appropriate parts of it. Mr Abe sees the United States, India and Australia as his country's key partners with the capability of, and shared interests in, balancing growing Chinese power.
The enterprise of bringing the four parties together - first under an "Asian Quadrilateral" and now under an "Asian Democratic Security Diamond" - might well be packaged under the label of liberal democracy, but is grounded on the principles of good old realism. It is the shared interests and capabilities in balancing Chinese power that underpins this geometry, not their domestic political orders. If, say, Communist Party-run Vietnam were to seek to join the project, Mr Abe is quite likely to upgrade the initiative to a pentagon.
What matters is whether and to what extent are the points of the diamond willing to confront China. Five years ago, the Asian Quadrilateral died because they were not. Kevin Rudd, Australia's former prime minister, might get most of the blame for it, but none of the other countries then had the appetite to engage in an initiative against China's objections. Also, there were a lot of people in New Delhi, Washington, Tokyo, Canberra and other places who believed in - and wished for - China's "peaceful rise".
With parts of the Indo-Pacific close to outright military conflict today on the back of Beijing's extravagant territorial claims, there is greater enthusiasm for architectures, alliances and initiatives that balance China. If it appears as if China is being 'encircled' or 'contained' by its neighbours in concert with the United States, then most of the blame should be directed at Beijing. There is a popular tendency to praise China's leaders for being astute strategists who think long-term, in comparison to the myopic politicians in democracies who don't get strategy. Well, you are not much of a strategist if you provoke all your major neighbours into weighing how to contain you, while the only allies you have are bankrupt delinquents exhibiting terrorists, nuclear weapons and missiles. One measure of China's new leadership's performance must be how well they can reverse the acute insecurities their predecessors created across the Indo-Pacific region.
The countries of the region, not least Japan, will count on that. Japan is, after all, a wealthy island nation that is dependent on sea-borne trade, with a greying population, a pacifist constitution, territorial disputes with China and within range of North Korea's nuclear arsenal. The United States does provide it with a nuclear umbrella, but the defence relationship has a physical footprint that is unpopular in many sections of the population. The scars of the Second World War prevent it from developing closer ties with many East Asian countries despite decades of generous Japanese development assistance. Tokyo's need for allies beyond its immediate neighbourhood is therefore acute and Mr Abe's government has started cultivating them with greater clarity and energy than ever.
A strong multi-dimensional relationship with Japan is crucial for India. That the relationship is moving beyond investment and development assistance into the strategic realm is a good thing. As India's export of rare earth minerals to Japan shows, we have what they need and vice versa. There's a lot of dogma and dearly-held twentieth-century principle to get around on both sides, but it does appear that a start has been made. We can thank China for that.
A number of media reports were quick to declare that Dr Singh and Mr Abe are engaged in a project to counter China. Yes, it has that effect. What many analyses miss out is that strong bilateral ties broaden the two countries' policy options with regard to the United States as well. There is no doubt that Indian, Japanese and American interests are in alignment in many important contexts today. That said, it is quite possible that they sometimes are not. As Stanford University's Daniel Sneider notes, "below the surface, many Japanese of all political stripes were never comfortable with a strategy of reflexive dependence on the United States." That argument resonates in New Delhi as well.
It is unlikely that Abepolitik's grand designs will take shape in the manner its proponents intend, for the United States, Australia, India and even Japan do not see conflict with China as being in their interests. The reasons why the Quadrilateral died a quiet death have not gone away entirely. Even so, to the extent that the prospect of an Asian Democratic Security Diamond tempers China's assertiveness, it makes sense to keep this iron in the fire.
The writer is director of the Takshashila Institution, an independent public policy think tank
Disclaimer: These are personal views of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of www.business-standard.com or the Business Standard newspaper
