Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar came to Delhi from Goa having built up a reputation for efficiency as chief minister of that state. However, some months into his tenure, he has struggled to articulate India's defence policy clearly - something that is less his fault than a symptom of the muddled thinking about strategic affairs that predates his time in office. Over the past week, for example, Mr Parrikar has confused observers about two major decisions. The first question is whether or not India will buy more than 36 Rafale fighters from France's Dassault Aviation. Earlier, the minister had said India would "save the cost" of 90 fighters, as it would buy only 36 instead of the 126 planned. But, on Tuesday, he said: "I am not saying we will buy more Rafale; I'm not saying we will not buy more." Left unclear is why, if India is buying more than 36 Rafales, it could not stick to the process earlier decided. The second apparent volte-face comes about the mountain strike corps that had been a pet project of the previous government. After Mr Parrikar said the corps would be "trimmed down", his ministry had indicated that the mountain strike corps would not be 70,000 strong as planned, costing Rs 88,000 crore, but half that size. But now Mr Parrikar has said that this would be only "temporary" and when funds became available, the corps would be built up to the size planned by the United Progressive Alliance.
The impression of strategic confusion being conveyed by such statements does not do India or its government proud. The essential problem is that such decisions are not taken within a clear strategic framework that would keep them clear and consistent - with each other and over time. On the matter of the mountain strike corps, for example, the question will be asked: was the creation of a fourth strike corps really essential? Was it a cost-efficient response to the Chinese challenge as it exists in 2015, as opposed decades ago? On the Rafale deal, while many argue that the purchase was urgent, it is necessary again to question the assumptions underlying that claim. Is it the case that war on the scale that would require an off-the-shelf purchase is expected in the years before "made in India" Rafales would be available? Further, what is the rationale for considering the air force "under-strength"? Are 45 squadrons of modern warplanes really needed to fight a war in 2015? Is a two-front war really a possibility?
Successive governments have failed to ask these and similar questions. As a result, India's national security strategy is the equivalent of blundering in the dark. Ideas on how to fix this do, in fact, exist. The Kargil Review Committee under the previous National Democratic Alliance government came up with ideas that were updated by the Naresh Chandra committee a few years ago. But the likely recommendations of the latter - including a joint-chiefs system to help with strategic planning - ran into objections from many, especially the military, and have not been implemented. India is still operating from a strategy devised in 1964, when Gnats ruled the sky, China had just invaded and Pakistan was twice the size it is today. If Mr Parrikar wishes to recover his reputation for efficiency and clear-thinking, he would do well to work towards conducting the institutional reform that will begin to reverse India's strategic confusion.
