With the world's major polluters, including the United States, China and the European Union, having already declared their voluntary targets for reduction in the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs), as part of the effort to mitigate catastrophic global warming, attention is now focused on India's proposal. As chief economic advisor (CEA) Arvind Subramanian has suggested, India will need to recast its approach towards climate change. The most important fact to note is this: India can no longer be tied to China in the world's eyes, or in any final treaty. Simply put, China has occupied its carbon space, whereas India is yet to do so. Even if China peaks its GHG emissions by 2030, as it has committed, and the US manages to slash its emissions by 32 per cent by that year, these countries will still be spewing an estimated 14-17 tonnes of GHGs per capita. This will be more than double India's most liberally projected carbon emission level, of seven to eight tonnes per head in 2030. At present, its per capita GHG emissions are merely 1.7 tonnes.
However, this shift in emphasis will require delicate positioning in order to ensure India is not sold as the "bad boy" holding up a treaty. It is true that India is entitled to stick to the 1997 Kyoto framework; but the facts on the ground have in fact changed. India's negotiating position will have to reflect that, if it expects success. It should emphasise its already-announced agenda: it has a programme to lower the carbon intensity of its gross domestic product (GDP) by 20 to 25 per cent from 2005 levels by 2020; ambitious targets have been set for solar and wind energy, and for increasing forest cover. In addition, it should point out that it has high taxation on petroleum products, doing better than much of the West on this count. These existing promises could be enhanced, perhaps by an emissions intensity reduction target for 2030. This will need a credible domestic programme for low-carbon growth, such as was spelled out in the Kirit Parikh committee report.
While de-emphasising its demand for finance, India should recognise that, in today's circumstances, this is a negotiating position that may not be fulfilled. It could focus instead on, for example, clean coal. India should draw attention to the hypocrisy of the West, especially the US, about coal - they were stressing its use till they got shale oil and now they are keen that the World Bank stopped financing coal-linked projects. The fact is India will continue to be dependent on coal for the foreseeable future, and technology transfer and appropriate funding from the West on clean coal should be part of any final agreement. And if negotiations look to be heading towards a realistic accord, India must be prepared with a sweetener. Like China, the government should have a date for "peak" carbon emissions up its sleeve. China has said 2030; India's economy is possibly 10-15 years behind that and offer 2040 or 2045 as its date for peak carbon emissions.
Essentially, the objectives should be threefold: preventing the West pointing fingers at India; enhancing the chances of a settlement; and in return, de-emphasising old talking points without giving up on anything realistic. India must not compromise on equality in terms of emissions per head, or emissions per unit of GDP. Both are fair demands - and give India a great deal of carbon head-room. Given these fundamentals, ambitious national commitments on emissions intensity reductions, and if necessary a suitably distant carbon peak date, should be enough to satisfy both Indian growth demands and the requirements for an agreement.
