Indo-Pak progress

At long last, India and Pakistan have agreed on two major things. One is that they will restart the bus service between the Indian side of Kashmir and the Pakistan-occupied part of it. The other relates to the setting up of a gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistani territory.

The bus will run from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad. All Indians and Pakistanis will be entitled to use it, but not nationals from third countries.

The way was cleared for this agreement when India withdrew its insistence on travellers using passports.

Thereby hangs a tale. Until 1952, only travel passes were required. Pakistan then started insisting on passports and India gave in after some resistance.

Now, when India said let us retain the passports, it was Pakistan which insisted on reverting to travel papers. Its argument: using passports would allow India to claim that the LoC was indeed an international border!

In the case of the other major decision, the stability of gas supplies through the pipeline will be the responsibility of Iran and Pakistan.

India will merely take delivery of the gas at its border. While political risks remain, the assumption is that Pakistan will not try to block the flow of gas to India as it has an economic interest in it.

More importantly, there could be Iranian pressure. Apart from these two breakthroughs, several other outstanding issues are apparently in the process of being sorted out.

Not all of them may work out, but what's far more important is the fact that Pakistan has finally come round to the Indian view that it is important not to make everything a hostage to the Kashmir issue.

Between 1999 and 2003, President Pervez Musharraf had converted Kashmir into what he called the "core" issue. He had repeated ad nauseum that unless it was sorted out""naturally to Pakistan's satisfaction""it was futile to expect progress in other areas, even if they were clearly of mutual benefit.

Of major significance is the inference (for the time being, at least) that Pakistan is willing to reduce its meddling in Kashmir. Of course, this does not mean that the ISI, which is a major force in Pakistan, will not shift its operations elsewhere.

But at the visible level, Pakistan now appears to be affirming the change in its approach to relations with India. If it doesn't revert to its old ways, both countries can benefit from improved ties.

However, given Pakistan's past record, it would be wise not to pitch expectations too high. The infrequent high points in Indo-Pak relations have always been followed by disproportionately deep troughs.

They have all depended on the current tactical requirements of Pakistani governments, whether military or democratic.

If India keeps the dialogue process going at one end and stands firm on defending its vital interests at the other, Pakistan will gradually have to come to terms with itself and the ground realities.

While Kashmir is, and will remain, an emotive issue in Pakistan, once the gains from higher trade and people-to-people relations become visible, even the most cussed Pakistani government will think twice about maintaining anti-Indian rhetoric at a high pitch.

For India and Pakistan to live like normal neighbours, the Pakistani Army needs to go back to the barracks and the ISI needs to become less of a state-within-a-state.

But that stage is still a long way off.