Evaluating human life in economic terms has always baffled judges who are called on to decide the amount of compensation for death or injury. Some kind-hearted ones grant liberal amounts, while the strict constructionists write gripping their pens tightly. This was evident in some recent Supreme Court judgements. It almost looked like a gamble for litigants.
The most glaring example was the Upahaar cinema fire case in which 59 people died and 103 others were injured in 1997. The final decision was given last month in which the Supreme Court drastically reduced the amounts granted by the Delhi High Court earlier. The compensation was, thus, reduced from Rs 18 lakh to Rs 10 lakh for victims above 20 years and from Rs 15 lakh to Rs 7.5 lakh for those below 20 years. The damages to be paid to those injured were retained at Rs 1 lakh.
The court itself was aware of its limitations in assessing the loss. Compensation is generally awarded to place the claimants in the position she or he would have been in, had the wrongful negligence (or tort) not taken place. Over centuries, the English courts have quantified compensation under the heads of general damages, special damages and punitive damages. Those principles have been followed by the Indian courts. However, those formulae are applied by judges according to their subjective views. There is neither uniformity in judgments nor comprehensive legislation on the subject. The Upahaar judgment, therefore, called for a “sophisticated jurisprudence of public liability.” The Law Commission and the Supreme Court have always called for such a law, but two Bills on the subject lapsed in the 1960s and there was no attempt since then.
Most of the compensation claims arise in road and rail accidents. There are laws enabling such victims to claim damages before special tribunals. However, there is uncertainty in those forums too. Some Supreme Court judgments of recent weeks showed that despite codification, judges differ in translating the loss of life and limbs into hard cash.
Last week, a claim for damages was decided finally in which the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Supreme Court reached different figures for the same accident (Govind Yadav vs New India Assurance Co). Govind, 24, lost a leg and suffered grievous injuries in an accident in 2004. He claimed Rs 10.7 lakh from the insurance company for loss of earning, cost of medical treatment, artificial leg, physical pain, mental agony and other counts. The tribunal arrived at a figure of Rs 2.56 lakh. He moved the high court that raised the amount to Rs 3.06 lakh. When he approached the Supreme Court, it awarded Rs 9.54 lakh.
The judgment remarked that the amount awarded by the tribunal was meagre. “It can only be a matter of imagination as to how he will have to live for the rest of life with one artificial leg. He is expected to live for at least 50 years. During this period, he will not be able to live like a normal human being and will not be able to enjoy the life. The prospects of marriage have considerably reduced.”
In another judgment delivered last week, the Supreme Court awarded more than what the victim, an unskilled labourer, demanded from the owner and National Insurance Co for multiple permanent injuries he suffered in an accident (Sanjay Batham vs Munnalal Parihar). He moved the tribunal with a demand of Rs 4.2 lakh. He was granted a princely sum of Rs 25,000. When he moved the Madhya Pradesh High Court, it raised the figure to Rs 2 lakh. On further appeal, the Supreme Court granted him Rs 5.62 lakh. The court reiterated judicial precedents to assert that even if the claimant asked for a smaller amount, the court can grant a higher one since the Motor Vehicles Act speaks of a “just” amount. The law puts no bar on the court in awarding damages.
In another recent judgment, Ibrahim vs Raju, the victim got Rs 1,49,440 from the tribunal, Rs 40,000 more from the Karnataka High Court and Rs 6 lakh when he finally approached the Supreme Court.
This unpredictability of the judicial mind was ridiculed by a British jurist, A P Herbert, when he compared it to the medical profession. Imagine, after the removal of appendix by a local surgeon, we were taken before a district town surgeon, who ordered our appendix to be replaced. “Our surprise would give place to stupefaction if we were then referred to a distinguished surgeon in the state capital who would ask that our appendix should be extracted again, and finally if a board of surgeons in London ordered the appendix to be replaced. We would be happy that we are still alive. Yet such succession of operation is what our law provides.”
