What happened in Chennai is a classic reminder that severe damage can be caused when we ignore our rivers and water bodies and forge ahead with unbalanced city development. Earlier, Mumbai and Kolkata also had provided similar warnings when flooding took place, upsetting normal city living. Neglect of the Mithi river in Mumbai, ignoring Tolly's Nullah in Kolkata and now not taking into account the key role of the Adayar, Cooum and Kosathalaiyar rivers traversing the city of Chennai along with the opportunistic exploitation of land along the Buckingham canal - interpreting it as public land - have all upset the character of balanced city living, raised questions about the fundamentals of urban planning and caused untold misery.
Let us focus on Chennai. In addition to the rivers, and the Buckingham canal which intersects the Adayar and Cooum rivers within the city, the city had about 600 water bodies in the 1980s. The City Development Plan prepared in 2005 under the National Urban Renewal Mission referred to as many as 320 tanks and lakes within the city limits. One question that arises in the context of the damage caused by unprecedented rains this time is whether these water bodies have been properly listed, protected, maintained and allowed to play the role they are supposed to.
This is the city where, when the state government proposed to build an industrial park near the Chembarambakkam lake - which originally was a water body for irrigation but is now a reservoir to supply drinking water to the city - people went to court, and subsequently the government had to commit that the land around the lake would remain agricultural. The city's elevated railway has come up along stretches of the Buckingham canal, raising questions as to whether this has blocked culverts and checked the natural flow of drainage. Chennai's new airport terminal was built on the floodplains of the Adyar; pictures of aircraft stranded in water provide proof of what happens when nature's path is tampered with.
Further, if it is true that educational institutions, special economic zones and gated colonies have come up in good numbers in the catchment areas of the rivers and canals, one can imagine how much disruption of the natural drainage route would have resulted. Is there some way of finding out who is responsible for this callous violation of provisions when construction permissions were granted and completion certificates issued?
There are more questions about ignoring what needs to be protected or preserved. Isn't it a fact that the Pallikaranai marshland in the city has become the largest dumping site for solid waste? Hasn't the master plan of 2008 warned that, considering its importance and the drainage system it provides, contiguous swamp area in Pallikaranai should remain conserved, prohibiting development therein?
A CSE study carried out in the mid-1990s showed that most waterways in the city are choked with sludge and waste. It is also mentioned that government's own studies accept that waterways in Chennai convey treated and untreated sewage and garbage together. These waterways, which also function as the city's flood discharge channels, are encroached and built upon as well, affecting their flow. Huge amounts of untreated waste in the rivers lead to sludge formation, clogging the waterways. Will some details emerge as to what extent these factors have contributed to the misery seen in the city when unprecedented rains overtook the city?
There are some interesting contradictions as well, as far as city management is concerned. Chennai is reported to have a very successful rain water harvesting programme. Rain water harvesting structures are mandatory in all buildings. People responded to this requirement positively; they understood the value of water, since the city faces severe water shortages. Rain water harvesting had its impact, as studies showed that the average groundwater level improved; the quality of water improved, with a drop in total dissolved solids; and a very large percentage of city households have this facility installed. This kept aquifers recharged, and so fewer private wells go dry during droughts. Chennai Metro water became eligible for carbon credits by generating sufficient electricity through biogas from sewage sludge. Why did the present damage happen in such a vibrant and alert city?
Every city is supposed to have a well-prepared disaster management plan that is not only supposed to be updated regularly, but, before each season the district administration and the city system are expected to review preparedness to meet any type of extreme situation and alert all those concerned. Was this meticulously done? When water had to be released from the reservoir, was sufficient advance warning given and various possible eventualities assessed so that deaths could have been avoided, damage to property minimised and the food and sanitation requirements of those stranded adequately taken care of? What was the plan for the old, sick and the disabled? Did it work properly?
It is an absolute must that citizens should be given full details on all of these, not only for accountability within the system, but also as a warning for the future.
Did the master plan detail what needs to be done to ensure proper flow of water in situations like this, and how the flood plain should not be encroached upon? Does the city have a well-prepared drainage master plan, and where does it stand with regard to its implementation? If there have been lapses, should they not be revealed, and handled firmly? In the "smart city" vision and plan now prepared, how well has this issue been addressed, so that smartness means the city will not have to face such misery and agony again?
The writer was secretary of the Union urban development ministry
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