Usually, it isn’t easy to figure out exactly what the government of the People’s Republic of China is up to. But, sometimes, hints are worrying enough. For example, a disturbing sequence of news reports emerged recently that should impact any assessment of the state of Indo-China relations.
The first was news out of Beijing that the Western Tibet military command has had its rank and status raised. Most military commands of the People’s Liberation Army are, after a recent reorganisation, subordinate to a defence department under the Central Military Commission; the Western Tibet command, however, will be directly controlled by the PLA Ground Force, and will thus likely receive more attention and have its demands answered quicker. Some reports from within China indicated that this suggested the Western Tibet command would be more prepared for “combat assignments”.
This provided an ominous backdrop to the second piece of news that emerged recently: at the release of the US Department of Defense’s annual report on China, the Pentagon official responsible highlighted an “increase in capability and force posture” along the Indian border. This dovetails neatly with Indian defence ministry’s annual report for 2015-16, issued in March, which noted an “increase in assertiveness” by the PLA during routine patrolling along the Line of Actual Control.
Of course, we don’t know for certain what the reasons for these two changes are. It could any of a range of things, from greater worries about internal destabilisation to political manoeuvring.
One relatively benign explanation could be that, as China’s massive “One Belt, One Road” plans for infrastructure development into Central Asia and Pakistan begin to take hold, they worry as much about what might come back along the road into their restive border provinces. It is worth noting that many reports suggest the Xinjiang military command, which borders Af-Pak, might also be similarly upgraded. Better connectivity with Pakistan could be something of a double-edged sword; it might allow the export of stability to that troubled country, but it could also permit the import of instability. Certainly, strategists in Beijing are far more worried about jihadi terrorism and its incubators in Af-Pak than they were a decade ago.
But this may not be the only, or even the primary, reason for increased Chinese focus on areas bordering India. And, either way, it certainly suggests that China intends to further increase the already yawning gap in capabilities between it and India along the border.
New Delhi, however, looks set to ignore the signal this sends out. After enduring a few setbacks early on, most famously a PLA “incursion” while Chinese President Xi Jinping was actually in India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi seems to have decided that China is being more co-operative than otherwise – its international posture on such things as United Nations condemnation of Pakistan-based terrorists notwithstanding. This complacent approach, which seems to contradict the defence ministry’s own estimation of increased aggressiveness, needs to be re-examined.
What makes the need to revisit this assumption doubly urgent is that the abysmally poor level of India’s military preparedness continues to be on the back-burner. There is a range of issues – from personal armaments to border infrastructure – that need to be addressed.
The defence Budget for 2016-17 was only marginally increased, by 9.7 per cent over 2015-16 – less than the likely growth in nominal GDP. As a consequence, it appears that India’s defence expenditure as a proportion of GDP is at its lowest since 1962.
Note that this does not come at a time when the Centre is strapped for funds; clearly, it does not feel short enough of money to, say, embark on a privatisation programme. It also feels flush enough to satisfy ex-servicemen’s demands for higher pensions, and to actually raise more divisions in an already over-staffed, 19th-century army. And it certainly not a question of having to balance social-sector schemes and defence spending – those schemes can be and are fully funded.
The consequence of this complacency is that even simple purchases lie unmade – the army frequently complains it does not have enough bullets to fight. India’s parliamentarians have fortunately woken up to this fact; a recent meeting of the Standing Committee on defence apparently centred on India’s lack of preparedness.
Two years into its term, it is ironic that the National Democratic Alliance government, which promised a sharper national security stand, has done so little to increase border security. In fact, it seemingly de-emphasised border infrastructure. According to a report by Sushant Singh in The Indian Express, the defence ministry told MPs officially that Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar had personally written to Finance Minister Arun Jaitley asking for Rs 1,096 crore more for border roads; Jaitley said no. The skewed funding priorities are highlighted by reports that the manpower component of the new mountain strike corps has been given its full Rs 64,000 crore – but the infrastructure part, costing less than half that, hasn’t.
Yes, there’s no outrage on TV or Twitter about Chinese “incursions” at the moment. But should that lead to complacency at the top? The recent reports about developments on the Chinese side of the border should startle India’s leadership out of its happy doze.
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