WORLD ORDER
Henry Kissinger
Juan Cole
Penguin Press; 432 pages; $21.60
Henry Kissinger's latest book is probably one of his most magisterial works in recent years. He has brought together his familiarity with history, in particular European history, the principles of statecraft and diplomacy, to weave together an absorbing narrative about the international order or, as more relevant today, the lack of order. Indian readers will be especially interested in the section on India in the chapter titled "The Multiplicity of Asia", where he explores the Indian world view as contrasted with other versions.
At the heart of this volume is a fairly straightforward proposition: that international order has historically been maintained either by a powerful hegemon leading an empire - which may be known by different labels at different times in history but essentially involves setting the rules of the game that others have to generally follow - or through a concert of major powers who agree on rules of behaviour that impose collective restraint, and rely on precisely the inability of any one party to impose its will upon the others and uphold the balance of power. Examples of the former are the Persian and Roman empires, and the modern Pax Americana. The Westphalian state system that emerged in Europe after the Thirty Years' War in Europe that ended with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and that was crystallised at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 is the example of a multi-polar system. It is Mr Kissinger's argument that we are in the midst of a transition from a world order that has been held together, since the Second World War, by American hegemony to a multi-polar reality. However, there is greater anarchy all around us because there are now no new set of rules and norms that all major powers, both established and emerging, are able to agree on.
Mr Kissinger also draws attention to the fact that economic globalisation and the impact of new technologies, especially the digital revolution, makes the classic model of an independent, sovereign Westphalian state out of date. While nationalism continues to be a major political driver, political boundaries are unable to insulate any state from the forces of globalisation. There is far greater need for international institutions to enable collaborative responses to global trans-national challenges, as also the negotiation of new international regimes in several emerging domains, such as cyber and space. What is increasingly and acutely obvious is that both the existing state system and the international order, inherited from the end of the Second World War, can no longer preserve international peace and security.
Mr Kissinger considers the evolving Sino-American relations an important determinant of whether the current power transition will avoid an open conflict between a declining hegemon and an increasingly powerful rival. He acknowledges that both the United States and China say they are committed to a "new type of great power relations" that would avoid what many people consider an inevitable contest for predominance. According to Mr Kissinger, the concept "might have been put forward by either or both of these powers as a tactical manoeuvre. Nevertheless, it remains the only road to avoid a repetition of previous tragedies". This is a rather ominous assessment.
So what is Mr Kissinger's prescription for a new world order? Architects of any international order must reconcile the two aspects of power and legitimacy. This reconciliation must now take place in a vastly transformed global landscape, and must also be flexible enough to adapt to further change and uncertainty. That is a tall order and requires statesmanship among leaders, at least of all the major powers. Mr Kissinger believes, not unexpectedly, that the United States, "with its distinctive global culture and reach, is in a special position to foster on one level a concept of world order that respects the rich variety of distinctive civilizations that have evolved in every part of the world across the centuries".
It is difficult to accept this characterisation of a United States that is convinced of the universalist relevance of its political values and its manifest destiny. The acceptance of an emerging world with multiple concepts of what is legitimate and how power should be used is unlikely to sit comfortably with American attitudes and predilections.
Mr Kissinger is, however, probably prescient in positing a likely world order that will be an inter-connected and possibly loose cluster of several regional orders, each upheld by a major resident power or powers but with some overarching set of common principles.
While Mr Kissinger's ruminations on world order are based on deep historical insights, and an easy familiarity with the uses and misuses of power, his explorations of the world views of different civilisations are fascinating. He describes India as "a great civilization at the intersection of world orders, shaping and being shaped by their rhythms. It has been defined less by its political boundaries than by a shared spectrum of cultural traditions". Nevertheless, as Mr Kissinger recognises, it is India's historical experience and cultural particularities that influence its world view. Unlike many other analysts, he sees Nehru's non-alignment as a shrewd strategy of advancing India's interests in a particular historical and international context. He believes that India's foreign-policy behaviour is driven mainly by Westphalian principles of pursuing national interests despite often being packaged in moralistic rhetoric. Mr Kissinger predicts that "India will be a fulcrum of twenty-first century order: an indispensable element, based on its geography, resources, and tradition of sophisticated leadership, in the strategic and ideological equation of the region and of the global order at whose interaction it stands".
Is anyone listening?
The reviewer, a former foreign secretary, is chairman of the National Security Advisory Board and RIS, as well as a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi
