As Prime Minister Narendra Modi heads to Dhaka this weekend, news reports suggest that India is likely to help build a new port on the Bay of Bengal and that Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd is to bid for a large power project. This points to a greater engagement with Bangladesh in terms of helping the country expand its infrastructure. On the face of it, such initiatives allow India to compete with China, which has used this form of build and transfer diplomacy to inveigle itself to other neighbours from Myanmar to Sri Lanka. Bangladesh's navy has already bought two Chinese-made frigates and two Chinese submarines. So the pressure to prevent Bangladesh from developing a dependency on China is intense and real. The two militaries already exchange officers on courses of instruction; but this needs to be taken forward to training exercises of army and navy units. India should also offer Bangladesh warships and patrol craft built in India - gratis.
While the prime minister's neighbourhood-first policy is to be lauded, India should not rush to compete purely on what might be labelled China's terms. To mangle metaphors, building bridges is not the only way to win hearts. India's relationship with Bangladesh is deep and meaningful: witness the security cooperation between the two countries and the handover of ULFA suspects and alleged Islamist terrorists by Dhaka. The recent land boundary agreement was another remarkable achievement. There may also be an announcement allowing Indian bus services to travel through Bangladesh, effectively integrating India's Northeast much better than in the past. On the other hand, sending India's state-owned enterprises such as BHEL or NTPC as emissaries bearing gifts of development is a riskier gambit. Both at home and overseas, the Chinese have a track record of building large infrastructure projects quickly. India does not.
And even whether this makes the Chinese more popular in developing countries it is trying to woo is unclear. From Africa to Myanmar, large Chinese infrastructure projects alienate much more often than they win friends because of China's tendency to frequently use its own construction labour and cut sweetheart deals with the powers that be. Look no further than Sri Lanka, where the terms of the $5 billion in loans given to the previous government were a central issue in elections in January. The new government is asking questions about those terms, and signalling it wants to pursue a more "balanced" foreign policy. If Sri Lanka provides a morality tale of the pitfalls of following China's "infrastructure deals for the boys" charm offensive, another version of this could play out in Myanmar if and when the military government there abdicates. As Mr Modi heads for Dhaka, events of the past year and his own diplomacy suggest that the correct response to moves by China to create a "string of pearls" around India is to build a necklace of cooperation with countries such as Australia, Japan, Vietnam and Indonesia. That begins, first and foremost, with India's immediate neighbours.
