The recent incidents along the LoC (Line of Control) define the limits of control the civilian government in Pakistan has over the Pakistan Army and its jihadist paramilitaries, says Sushant Sareen, senior fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation, in an interview to Aditi Phadnis.
There were high hopes from the Nawaz Sharif regime in Pakistan. Everyone said: now that there's a civilian government in power, Pakistan-India relations will be on a more even keel. But there's no MFN (most-favoured nation status) in sight, border tension still dominates all other agenda and we're still waiting for peace
While Nawaz Sharif's victory in the elections certainly sent out good vibes because of his consistent stand on the need for improving relations with India, the expectation in India that India-Pakistan relations would undergo a magical transformation were unrealistic. Pakistan has serious structural obstacles and problems. Not the least of these is the Pakistan Army and its militant auxiliaries who exercise enormous influence inside Pakistan and have the ability, capability and intention to sabotage any forward movement in the direction of normalisation of relations with India. There is also Sharif's own conservative constituency that is not exactly bubbling over with excitement over his approach towards India.
Finally, he cannot ignore the political opposition that talks in favour of good relations with India but is quick to undermine any effort in this direction in order to score political points over rivals.
While MFN is only a transactional measure and not the game-changer that it is often made out to be, it is the border question (peace and tranquility) and terrorism which would serve as metrics for judging Sharif's ability and capacity to be the agent of change.
The recent incidents along the LoC (Line of Control) seem to have put a big question mark on whether Sharif would be able to rein in the traditional spoilers i.e. Pakistan Army and its Jihadist paramilitaries. At the same time, Sharif's statement expressing sadness over the loss of innocent lives keeps the hope flickering that he could still exert his authority to ensure that such incidents are stopped.
There is a view that applies to the entire subcontinent: that when India becomes a factor in the domestic politics of a neighbour, there's always a problem. You know so much about Pakistan: how much of a factor is India, in the politics of civilian-ruled Pakistan?
By virtue of its sheer size, its economy and its military might, it is quite natural for India to become an issue in the domestic politics of all its South Asian neighbours. Pakistan is no different. Although most Pakistani political parties claim they are in favour of improving relations with India, even if this consensus is conceded, the fact remains that there is no real consensus on how and on what terms relations are to be normalised. In other words, the old cliches continue to rule insofar as normalisation is concerned and these will continue to make India a political issue.
The obverse is also true: that when Pakistan enters the Indian politics discourse, the compulsion to be more nationalist dictates a harder line on Pakistan. This was at its most obvious in the exchange between the government and the BJP in Parliament. Why can't India and Pakistan sit round a table and discuss their problems: not as governments but as mature states?
That Pakistan becomes a political issue in India is correct, but it is not always the case that parties take a harder line on Pakistan. In 2004, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) actually used its peace initiative with Pakistan as an election issue. It is another matter that this tack didn't find many voters. Post 26/11, there seems to be a big change in the Indian public opinion, which has got an increasingly short fuse when it comes to Pakistan. The politicians have no choice but to respond to this sentiment among the people. The anger, anguish and outrage that people feel on incidents like the beheading of Indian soldiers or ambushing of troops or in the case of a terror strike cannot be trivialised by calling it a knee-jerk reaction or jingoism, the favourite terms used by turn-the-other-cheek liberals to explain the sentiment of the people.
What adds to the difficulty of the government is the perception that instead of a muscular response to any adventurism by Pakistan, the government,for some inexplicable reason, tries to play down things and even appease the perpetrator. Given that there is no strategic clarity, forget about consensus, at the political level on what policy to adopt towards Pakistan, it is inevitable that rival political parties will try to gain mileage from the discomfiture of the government after its 'peace' initiative or its efforts to have some engagement with Pakistan comes a cropper.
The political disconnect in both countries, coupled with peculiar dichotomy of power in Pakistan, prevents the two states from evolving a modus vivendi between them. Indians and Pakistanis get along like a house on fire as long as they are not trying to resolve the contentious issues between them. And while they have no problems in sitting around a table discussing, lampooning and even being cathartic about their own problems, they are unable to do the same with the problems between them, even less so at a serious political level.
Pakistan has so many internal problems. Do you see Sharif having the capacity to resolve them?
The people of Pakistan (more Punjab really) have reposed their confidence in Sharif because he seemed the best of the lot that was on offer. In the last two months, he hasn't exactly hit the ground running and is still working on how to handle many of these problems. It is one thing to have a policy and make a plan, quite another to implement it even at the cost of political popularity.
He has bitten the bullet on the issue of power tariffs. But whether he will go whole hog and make the structural reforms, which in the short and medium term will administer extreme pain to the people remains to be seen. His honeymoon period is all but over. Once the pain starts hitting the people, there is bound to be a reaction.
The issue of tackling terrorism is where he seems to be fumbling. He doesn't have much room for experimentation on the issue of terrorism. Unless he can come up with a clear strategy (not just policy) to take the bull of terrorism by the horns, the Pakistani state will continue its slide towards state failure.
What should we expect from the Pakistan and Afghan Taliban after western forces pull out of Afghanistan?
In a phrase: chaos, anarchy and cataclysmic developments. The Taliban are already on a roll, not just in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan. Regardless of whether the Afghan government is able to hold on after the pull-out or it folds up like a house of cards, the repercussions for the region are going to be very destabilising. Pakistan is likely to be sucked into the Afghan theatre in one way or another and will face the brunt of the fallout. An emboldened Taliban, particularly the Pakistani version, will almost certainly make a play for capturing power in Pakistan or at least a part of Pakistan. One thing is however certain. The pullout will serve as a steroid shot in the arm for the Islamists in the region.
