Once the counter-terror operation at the Indian Air Force base in Pathankot is well and truly over, questions will and must be asked and answered about how it was handled. Given that India was fortunate this time, and two separate pieces of intelligence were apparently available between 24 and 12 hours prior to the attack about the nature of the attackers and their likely target, the length of the operation and the loss of security personnel's lives must give rise to some serious soul-searching and the need to fix accountability. This is not the first time in recent years that a small group of jihadis has crossed the international border in this area and targeted a security installation. Certainly, it is a relief that - unlike in some similar attacks in Pakistan - air assets were not destroyed. But that is not enough. If errors were made in the handling of the situation, then they must be identified, and procedures put in place to prevent their happening again. One important area of focus must be whether or not the operational command of the counter-terror operation was sufficiently streamlined, in order to avoid the confusions that have marred this and similar operations all the way back to 26/11. Another series of questions the government must ask itself is whether its handling of the news about the attack is up to the mark. Timely, transparent and single-source briefings would have helped disperse much of the uninformed commentary occurring while the attack was on.
There are two larger questions that must be dealt with. The first is the question of India's own operational preparedness for such attacks, beyond any errors committed in this particular instance. If attacks such as the one in Pathankot are going to be a new template for jihadi groups operating out of Pakistan, what is the mechanism by which security installations near the border will be better secured? Clearly, relying on the Defence Security Corps, made up largely of superannuated service men, is not enough. Closer coordination will also be needed with local state police forces and the Border Security Force.
Second, what happens to the dialogue process between India and Pakistan? After all, this has just been given a kick-start at the highest level by Prime Minister Narendra Modi himself, through his unannounced stop-over at Lahore on Christmas Day. Surely, when the decision to do so was taken, it was done with a clear-eyed acknowledgement of the likelihood that anti-India forces within the Pakistani security establishment would try to scuttle dialogue by using jihadi proxies. The Pathankot attack was just a realisation of that expectation, as was the nearly-simultaneous attack on the Indian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan. Given this reality, a demand for explanations from Pakistan as to what happened is reasonable - but Mr Modi should also make it clear to all concerned, including those within his own party, that he still has every intention of ploughing ahead with his chosen dialogue process. Statements by high officials of the government, including the prime minister, have so far been eminently restrained, which does them considerable credit.
