Out of the cul-de-sac

It is not often that the verdict on a bitterly contested dispute satisfies both the contending parties. It is even rarer that both the contestants can claim victory. This is what has happened in the case of the longstanding dispute between India and Pakistan over the construction of the Baglihar dam on the Chenab, in Doda district of Jammu & Kashmir. The final award by the World Bank-appointed "neutral mediator", Raymond Lafitte, has been hailed by both New Delhi and Islamabad as vindication of their respective stands. Regardless of the repercussions of the award on the 450-Mw Baglihar power project, both Professor Lafitte and the World Bank deserve kudos for handling the situation the way they have. While the former has crafted the decree deftly, mollifying both the parties, the latter displayed deft diplomacy by not disseminating the text of the award but simply handing over its copies to New Delhi and Islamabad, letting them interpret it in their own manner for their domestic constituencies.

Going by whatever has been given out by the two governments for public consumption, it seems clear that the ruling has upheld India's right to build a run-of-the-river power project, even as it has asked the country to keep the height of the dam 1.5 metres lower than its proposed level, and to make some other minor changes to the project. By doing so, it has given Pakistan room for consolation. Going further, the final report has sought to limit the scope for disputes over other, similar projects by categorically stating that India can build dams by using new techniques for dealing with sedimentation, which were not available when the Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960. In a way, this is of greater significance than the minor changes to be made to the dam's height, parapet wall structure and power intake sources, as mooted in the award. India can safely implement these alterations as they will lead chiefly to a reduction in the water-holding capacity and not cause much erosion in the project's power production capacity. By upholding the right to build more projects, the Lafitte ruling has virtually given a go-ahead for several other small- and medium-scale projects (including Dul Hasti and Salal) which India plans to build on the Chenab and on the two other west-flowing Himalayan rivers allotted to Pakistan under the 1960 treaty. What is more, this verdict should blunt Islamabad's objections to projects like the Tulbul navigation scheme, and the Sawalkote and Kishanganga hydro-power projects, all located in the power-deficient state of Jammu & Kashmir.

On the political front, the end of the Baglihar wrangle should bode well for the Indo-Pak peace initiatives. Indeed, if this ruling could lead to bilateral consensus on re-visiting the outmoded and, in a way, ill-conceived Indus Waters Treaty, that would be a denouement much to be wished for. The treaty's most serious deficiency is that it allocates rivers to the two countries and not the waters available in their basins. As such, it neither takes into account neither the potential of each river system nor the needs of the people living in its command area. Now that better methods are available for assessing such parameters, it should not be difficult to rectify these flaws and re-draft the treaty on modern, globally observed norms for sharing the waters of international river systems.